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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Antibacterial resistance is a growing global problem.  According to the most recent statistics from 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), at least 2 million people acquire serious infections 
with bacteria that are resistant to one or more of antibacterial drugs designed to treat those infections in 
the United States alone.  Of these, approximately 23,000 die as a result of drug-resistant infections.  Even 
though estimates vary widely, the economic cost of antibacterial resistance in the United States could be 
as high as $20 billion and $35 billion a year in excess direct healthcare costs and lost productivity costs, 
respectively (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013).  
Despite the potential of new antibacterial products to reduce the social burden associated with 
resistant infections, some of the large companies have been exiting the markets for antibacterial drugs and 
vaccines in recent years and have also failed to respond to the possible social value of opportunities in 
production of rapid diagnostic products.  These market exits have been driven by the most basic of 
reasons: insufficient return to capital invested in development of these products.  Consequently, 
governments across the globe are looking to identify ways to stimulate the development of antibacterial 
products. 
This study, conducted by Eastern Research Group, Inc. (ERG) under contract to the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation (ASPE) and partly funded by FDA, develops an analytical decision-tree model framework that 
can be used to assess the impacts of different possible market incentives on the private and social returns 
to product development of new antibacterial products (in contrast to those already under development). 
Using the model developed, we evaluate the private and social returns associated with the 
following types of antibacterial products for a hypothetical developer at the beginning of pre-clinical 
research phase: 
 Antibacterial drugs for oral or intravenous (IV) administration designed to treat: 
- Acute bacterial otitis media (ABOM); 
- Acute bacterial skin and skin structure infections (ABSSSI); 
- Community acquired bacterial pneumonia (CABP); 
- Complicated intra-abdominal infections (CIAI); 
- Complicated urinary tract infections (CUTI); and 
- Hospital acquired/ventilator associated bacterial pneumonia (HABP/VABP). 
 A new vaccine effective in preventing acute bacterial otitis media (ABOM), and 
 A new rapid point-of-care diagnostic designed to identify methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) that can cause serious infections, such as skin or wound 
infections, pneumonia, or infections of the blood 
The study also considers the level needed to reach a private value of $100 million at the start of 
pre-clinical research for a hypothetical developer for the following four categories of incentives that 
encompass the majority of strategies that have been proposed in the policy literature:  
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 Intellectual property (IP) extensions; 
 Tax incentives; 
 Modifications to the clinical trial process and approval standards aimed at shortening the drug 
development process; and 
 Private grants, awards, and prizes for antibacterial product research and development. 
For antibacterial drugs (see Table E - 1), we find that the average value to the developer 
considering whether to start pre-clinical research ranges from a low of -$4.5 million for HABP/VABP to 
a high of $37.4 million for CABP, falling short of the $100 million threshold.  However, when parameter 
uncertainty is considered, the lower bound of private returns could potentially range from -$23.5 million 
(HABP/VABP) to -$15.8 million (ABSSSI), substantially lower than the $100 million threshold, and the 
upper bound from $126.7 (HABP/VABP) to $330.0 million (CABP), considerably above the $100 
million threshold. The primary drivers for the observed wide range of results are attributable to, in order 
of importance, the total market size, the real opportunity cost of capital, and the total time to market 
model parameters.  Value of the incentives to the developers would be higher at later stages of 
development, meaning that once a drug successfully reaches certain milestones, incentives to further 
develop it increase.  However, we focus on the value at the point the developer is considering whether to 
start the pre-clinical stage. 
Table E - 1: Antibacterial Drug Private Returns (Figures are in $ Million) 
Indication Private Value (in $ Million) 90% Lower Bound Mean 90% Upper Bound 
ABOM -$18.8 -$2.7 $215.1 
ABSSSI -$15.8 $27.1 $198.9 
CABP -$17.6 $37.4 $330.0 
CIAI -$18.0 $8.9 $222.5 
CUTI -$16.3 $21.9 $213.0 
HABP/VABP -$23.5 -$4.5 $126.7 
Note that this study considers the  developer’s  private  value  from the point of the current state of 
science.  Assessing advancements in translational research and basic pathogen biology were outside the 
scope of this project.  However, we note that such advancements have the potential to impact private 
value of a drug at the start of pre-clinical studies.  For example, improved understanding of pathogen 
biology can cut pre-clinical research time and can yield compounds with higher average efficacy entering 
human trials. 
To assess the extent to which these private values fall short of the societal importance of drugs, 
we estimate the potential social value for these antibacterial drugs.  Similar to private returns, we find that 
there is wide variation in the estimated social values across the different indications (see Table E - 2).  
The primary drivers for the observed wide range of social EPV results are attributable to, in order of 
importance, the model parameters for the percentage in disease duration for patients that do not respond 
to commonly used antibacterial drugs; phase 1 clinical trial success probability; pre-clinical R&D success 
probability, and the real annual social rate of discount. 
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Despite the high degree of variability, even the lower bounds of these social values (see Table E - 
2) are greater than the estimated private ENPVs by orders of magnitude across all of the indications.  
Moreover, for CABP, CUTI, and HABP/VABP, the 90 percent lower bounds of social values are greater 
than the 90 percent upper bounds of private values for the same indications. 
Table E - 2: Antibacterial Social Returns (Figures are in $ Million) 
Indication Social Value Min Mean Max 
ABOM $48 $486.6 $5,363 
ABSSSI $58 $584.2 $6,133 
CABP $706 $9,375.3 $72,494 
CIAI $114 $1,069.2 $10,231 
CUTI $674 $6,064.6 $54,795 
HABP/VABP $1,068 $12,165.6 $161,335 
Using the decision-tree framework developed, we estimate the private and social value for a new 
ABOM vaccine at $515.1 million (which is greater than the $100 million threshold) and $2.281 billion, 
respectively. Similarly, the private and social value for new rapid point-of-care diagnostic designed to 
identify methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) that can cause serious infections is 
estimated at $329.0 million and $22.1 billion, respectively.  
The gap between the current private and public values of drug development suggest that 
incentives are desirable to stimulate the development of drugs to treat the six indications considered, 
whether through incentives described in this report or public research investment.  However, given the 
degree of uncertainty associated with different model parameters and the limited scope of this project, it is 
difficult to ascertain the necessary levels of such incentives.  The size of the social benefits from 
developing a new antibacterial drug is also highly uncertain and based on the improvement in outcomes 
from a hypothetical new drug. 
It is also important to note that simultaneous institution of conservation mechanisms, such as 
education campaigns to promote prudent use, and other stewardship programs, along with the types of 
antibacterial drug production incentives considered are likely to alter the incentive levels identified in this 
study.  Conservation incentives, by their very nature, tend to reduce the potential market size for new 
antibacterial drugs thereby necessitating higher production incentive levels to boost private returns to the 
$100 million threshold. 




Modern medicine relies on effective antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and rapid diagnostic tools, 
collectively  referred  to  as  “antibacterial  products”  hereinafter,  for  the  prevention,  detection,  and  treatment  
of bacterial infections.  Since antibacterial drugs first came into use in the 1940s, they have transformed 
mankind’s  ability  to  combat  deadly  microorganisms  and  saved  innumerable  lives.    However,  use  of  these  
drugs is not without consequences.  The mutations and natural selection processes that occur when an 
antibacterial drug is utilized can lead to the selection of strains of bacteria that are resistant to antibacterial 
drug or drugs.  Many such strains (e.g., methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) are now quite 
common throughout the U.S. and the world.  Today, the rapid rate of increase in antibacterial drug 
resistant bacteria combined with a weak pipeline for new antibacterial drugs threatens to create a public 
health crisis in which we are no longer able to effectively treat common infections (Kesselheim & 
Outterson, 2010; Laxminarayan & Malani, 2007; Infectious Diseases Society of America , 2004; Smith & 
Coast, 2013). 
Drug resistance problems are compounded by the misuse of existing antibacterial drugs.  
Antibacterial drugs are commonly overused by physicians and patients; for example, they may be 
prescribed to treat conditions caused by viral pathogens, which will not respond to antibacterial treatment, 
or for infections that will resolve quickly on their own.  Additionally, under-treatment through inadequate 
dosage or inappropriate treatment duration can also give rise to resistant bacterial strains (Laxminarayan 
& Malani, 2007; Kesselheim & Outterson, 2010; Levy, 1992). 
Appropriate use of existing diagnostic tests and/or the development of new tests could help 
relieve selective pressure resulting from unnecessary or inappropriate antibacterial use.  By identifying 
the etiologic causes of infections, diagnostic tools can help physicians determine an appropriate course of 
treatment for their patients.  Unfortunately, many existing tests are too slow to provide results, too 
invasive or uncomfortable for patients, or too expensive to be practical (Laxminarayan & Malani, 2007). 
An alternative mechanism for reducing antibacterial drug demand is infection prevention, which 
might be achieved in part through more widespread vaccination, the development of additional vaccines, 
and more effective infection control, especially in health care facilities.  Plus, there are likely to be 
spillover benefits from vaccination of part of the population to unvaccinated individuals.  Nevertheless, 
the cost and voluntary nature of vaccinations hinder their uptake, and vaccines for some common 
infections, such as a vaccine to prevent infections caused by Staphylococcus aureus, are not yet available 
(Laxminarayan & Malani, 2007). 
Despite the potential of new antibacterial products to reduce the social burden associated with 
resistant infections, some of the large companies have been exiting the markets for antibacterial drugs and 
vaccines in recent years and have also not responded to the possible social value of opportunities in 
production of rapid diagnostic products.  These market exits have been driven by the most basic of 
reasons: insufficient return to capital invested in development of these products.  Commentators have 
identified a number of factors limiting markets for some new antibacterial products, including short 
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treatment durations, an absence of market mechanisms to capture social benefits, challenges of 
conducting clinical trials, use of single-purchaser government power to limit payments for final products, 
and the availability of cheap generic drugs to treat most infections.  However, empirical evidence is 
lacking to evaluate the relative impact of these factors (Kesselheim & Outterson, 2010; Mossialos, et al., 
2010).  Furthermore, there remain a number of participants in, as well as, new entrants to these markets 
and there are opportunities for novel products despite the exits of many large companies (Usdin, 2012).  
Current antibacterial product development efforts are directed primarily towards addressing the treatment 
of acute bacterial skin and skin structure infections including infections caused by methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Clostridium difficile associated diarrhea, and some infections caused by 
drug-resistant gram-negative pathogens. 
Given the potentially sizable social benefits of new antibacterial products, governments have 
been considering a number of alternative policies to foster development.  While many approaches have 
been proposed, the path for policymakers to succeed in accelerating antibacterial product development is 
not well established.  Further, a rigorous transparent analytical framework that can be used to 
systematically examine the effects of different policy alternatives is currently lacking.  This study is 
therefore intended to fill that void by developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics 
(private and social value) of development of antibacterial products that can aid in considering potential 
strategies designed to incentivize these antibacterial products.  
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
There are two primary objectives to this study: 1) the creation of an economic framework for 
antibacterial drug development decisions and 2) the assessment of the impact of various incentives on 
their development.  As secondary objectives, this study creates a similar framework for the development 
of vaccines and rapid point of care diagnostics and examines the social returns to developing new 
antibacterial products. 
For the antibacterial drug development framework, the study examines the private and social 
returns (i.e., expected present value, EPV) to developing a new antibacterial drug for oral or intravenous 
(IV) administration for each of the following six indications: 
 Acute bacterial otitis media (ABOM); 
 Acute bacterial skin and skin structure infections (ABSSSI); 
 Community acquired bacterial pneumonia (CABP); 
 Complicated intra-abdominal infections (CIAI); 
 Complicated urinary tract infections (CUTI); and 
 Hospital acquired/ventilator associated bacterial pneumonia (HABP/VABP). 
These six indications represent major areas of antibacterial use.  In our EPV model, they are 
differentiable by forecasted developer revenues and costs, as well as by associated social costs and 
benefits that would accrue as a result of having a new drug available to treat them. 
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We also examine vaccines and rapid diagnostics.  Vaccine markets vary with the specific disease 
under consideration.  Thus, for the purposes of this study, we model a new vaccine designed to offer 
protection against acute bacterial otitis media (ABOM) infections commonly caused by nontypeable 
Haemophilus influenzae and by Moraxella catarrhalis.  
Rapid diagnostics tools influence the rate and effectiveness of antibacterial use and thus affect 
their use in healthcare settings.  In this study, we focus on a new rapid diagnostic tool designed to identify 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) that can cause serious infections, such as skin or 
wound infections, pneumonia, or infections of the blood.  While a newer type of MRSA is community-
acquired, here we focus primarily on healthcare-associated MRSA infections, which occur in hospitals 
and nursing homes. 
The study also considers a number of possible incentives within the private and social EPV 
framework developed.  We examine the following four categories of incentives that encompass the 
majority of strategies that have been proposed in the policy literature:  
 Intellectual property (IP) extensions; 
 Tax incentives; 
 Modifications to the clinical trial process and approval standards; and 
 Grants, awards, and prizes for antibacterial drug research and development. 
The above incentive categories are described in more detail in Section 2. 
1.3 DATA SOURCES 
For constructing our EPV model, we compiled information from a variety of sources, including: 
 Systematic reviews of published literature; 
 Interviews with experts, including individuals who previously worked for drug companies 
and now advise companies on drug development, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
personnel, drug company representatives, clinicians, and hospital pharmacists; 
 IMS Health data on drug expenditures; and 
 Databases available through the CDC National Center for Health Statistics; 
- National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) 
- National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS) 
- Compressed Mortality File 
- Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample (HCUP NIS) 
- National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS)  
- National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR) 
- National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) 
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Our literature search targeted several categories of literature: peer-reviewed articles in scientific 
journals, unpublished papers and presentations, white papers, gray literature,1 and news stories and 
occasional pieces appearing in newspapers and magazines or other print media outlets.  Our search 
methodology featured systematic inquiries of the following databases:  
 PubMed for peer-reviewed healthcare and biomedical journals; 
 Lexis/Nexis academic for mass media and other periodical publications; and  
 PAIS, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, and Embase for gray literature. 
The search strategies differed for each category of literature and related database, but each query 
employed search terms in various combinations using logic strings. 
Some of the information needed for modeling the private and social EPV came from semi-
structured discussions with independent experts, FDA personnel, drug sponsors, clinical researcher, 
clinicians, and hospital pharmacists.  In accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
guidelines, we limited the number of interviews involving the same set of questions to fewer than 10.  
From these interviews, we collected information about how drug sponsors make the decision to move 
forward with the development of a novel antibacterial drug, vaccine, or diagnostic, magnitudes of various 
cost components (e.g., clinical trial costs, non-clinical expenditures, post-approval pediatric study 
commitments, etc.), timelines for getting a new product to market, and health practitioner adoption rates 
and considerations.  
We used IMS Health data on drug expenditures to estimate the total market size for each of the 
indications.    Through  FDA’s  Third  Party  Agreement  with  IMS  Health,  we  obtained  5  years  (2007  – 2011) 
of U.S. sales data on a total of 43 and 31 antibacterial drugs in intravenous (IV) and solid oral dosage 
form, respectively.  The data provided included information on: 
 Extended Units (EU) – These are the number of individual tablets, capsules, etc. for solids; 
number of grams or milliliters for other forms.  
 Total Dollars (DOL/TOT) – This measure reports the amount of money pharmacies, non-
federal hospitals, federal facilities, long-term care facilities, clinics, and HMOs spent on a 
product acquired from manufacturers and drug wholesalers. 
 Units – This corresponds to the total amount of packages sold of a particular drug to the 
dispensing outlet/chain/hospital. 
 There  are  a  number  of  databases  that  are  available  through  CDC’s  National  Center  for  Health  
Statistics (NCHS).  We used these databases, as appropriate, to estimate disease duration and 
number of patients per annum in the U.S. for the different indications covered in the study.  
Details on how each of these databases was utilized are provided in the sections related to 
each of these indications below. 
                                                     
1 Gray literature encompasses those publications that fall outside of the realm of normal publishing outputs, such as 
journals and books.  Examples of gray literature include technical reports written for a specific audience, 
dissertations and theses, article pre-prints, white papers, and conference proceedings. 
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2 INCENTIVES FOR DEVELOPING ANTIBACTERIAL DRUGS, 
VACCINES FOR BACTERIAL DISEASES, AND RAPID 
DIAGNOSTICS 
The literature is replete with possible incentives to stimulate new antibacterial product 
development.  Additionally, the recently enacted Title VIII (Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now) of the 
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (Public Law 112-144)(GAIN), creates 
incentives to encourage the development of antibacterial or antifungal drugs for the treatment of serious 
or life-threatening infections, including drugs to treat antibacterial drug-resistant infections.  GAIN 
extends the period of exclusivity for certain qualifying products by adding 5-years of additional 
exclusivity.  In this study, we took a comprehensive approach to examining incentives, not just those that 
are included in GAIN. 
For organization purposes, we adopted the incentive categories proposed by Kesselheim and 
Outterson (2010) as our starting point as presented in Table 1 below.  The columns in the table depict the 
goal of the incentive under consideration, i.e., conservation or production.  Conservation efforts aim to 
limit the development of drug resistance in drugs currently on the market while production incentives aim 
to stimulate development of new drug compounds.  The rows correspond to the four primary legal tools 
that can be used to achieve conservation or production goals, i.e., property, regulation, contract or tort.   
Optimal antibacterial drug incentive strategies would combine elements from both columns, 
incentivizing both conservation as well as new production.  To the extent that the same impacts can be 
attained through different legal mechanisms (i.e., property, regulation, contract, or tort), we view the 
choice of specific mechanism used as a practical decision outside the scope of this study.  
Table 1: Types of Incentives for Antibacterial Drug, Vaccine, and Diagnostic Product Development 
Type Conservation Production 
Property  Intellectual property (IP) used as conservation tools to privately constrain demand (1)  
Intellectual property (IP) used as incentives to 
bring new antibacterial drugs to market (2)  
Regulation  
Public health infection control and antibacterial 
drug stewardship programs regulate demand for 
antibacterial drugs (3)  
FDA regulations relaxed to speed approval of 
new antibacterial drugs. Tax subsidies support 
R&D (4)  
Contract  Prizes, grants, and value-based reimbursement support antibacterial drug conservation. (5)  
Prizes, grants, and value-based reimbursement 
support new antibacterial drug production. (6)  
Tort  
Patients sue for hospital-associated infections, 
increasing institutional incentives to promote 
safety through antibacterial drug conservation (7)  
Federal law designed to preempt state tort law, 
waiving drug company tort liability for 
antibacterial drugs (8)  
Source: Kesselheim & Outterson, 2010 
Next, we undertook a comprehensive review of the policy literature on antibacterial drug 
incentives that have been proposed over the past decade to start with an organized list.  This literature 
review resulted in the identification of over 50 incentives that fell into one of the 8 categories shown in 
Table 1.  For example, the conservation-regulation category included 18 different incentives from the 
policy literature ranging from education campaigns to encourage appropriate use to expanding the 
promotion of vaccination to providing transparency on institutional infection rates. 
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We then performed an initial qualitative iterative evaluation that involved assessing each of the 
50+ incentives against multiple criteria depicted in Table 2.  We combined incentives that were 
considered similar.  For  example,  “incentive  designed  to  encourage  antibacterial drug substitutes, such as 
free  or  heavily  discounted  “cold  kits”  to physicians”  and  “education  campaigns  to  encourage  appropriate  
use of antibacterial drugs”  were  combined  into  one  incentive  category  titled  “education  campaigns.”  
Table 2: Antibacterial Incentive Evaluation Criteria 
Evaluation Question Yes No Comment 
Is the incentive practical to implement? { { ______________________ 
Is implementation time for the incentive reasonable? { { ______________________ 
Is the incentive politically feasible? { { ______________________ 
Is there a good match between the incentive and type of developer? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive avoid creating market distortions? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive impede access and affordability? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive avoid creating other perverse incentives or outcomes? { { ______________________ 
Are the transaction costs imposed by the incentive acceptable?  { { ______________________ 
Is the level of risk associated with the incentive acceptable? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive stimulate valuable innovation? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive stimulate competition? { { ______________________ 
Is the incentive cost-effective compared to next best alternative? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive promote development of antibacterial drugs? { { ______________________ 
Does the incentive promote conservation and/or appropriate use?  { { ______________________ 
Is the incentive within possible FDA/DHHS purview? { { ______________________ 
Can the incentive be analyzed within EPV model framework?  { { ______________________ 
This initial evaluation process resulted in reducing the 50+ incentives to the 10 as depicted in 
Table 3 below  that  ultimately  correspond  to  the  5  categories  shown  in  the  “Private  NPV  Model  Category”  
column.    The  table  shows  each  incentive’s  expected  impact  on  parameters  in  the  private  and  social NPV 
models (explained below), as well as the intention of the incentive (i.e., to promote development of 
antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and/or rapid diagnostic tools, or to promote antibacterial drug conservation).  
The table also depicts the parameters that each of the 10 incentive categories would impact within the 
private EPV model framework developed for the study (see Sections 3.1 and 3.5 for discussions of the 
private and social frameworks, respectively).  Further examination of this list of 10 from a modeling 
perspective resulted in combining those categories of incentives that impact the same model parameters 
resulting  in  a  total  of  5  incentive  categories  noted  in  the  “Private  NPV  Model  Category”  column  of  Table 
3.  For example, the  incentives  “education  campaigns”  through  “performance- and value-based 
reimbursement  schemes”  affect  the  same  model  parameter,  “unit  sales”,  in  the  same  direction.   Thus, we 
cannot really distinguish between education campaigns and vaccine promotion in the context of our 
model and hence need to combine these into one category for analysis purposes. 
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(IP) extensions [a]  
 Increase in sponsor 
revenue stream due to 
delayed generic entry 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections due to new 
antibacterial product 
 Reduced market competition 







generic entry  
Tax incentives  Decrease in cost of capital 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections due to new 
antibacterial product 
 Reduced tax revenue for the 
government 
Yes Yes Yes Possible [i] Tax incentives 
Decreases 
cost of capital  
Modifications to the 




 Decrease in time to 
market 
 Decrease in clinical 
trial costs 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections due to new 
antibacterial product 
 Increase in probability of adverse 



















and development  
 Decrease in R&D costs 
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severity of infections due to new 
antibacterial product 
 Added societal cost equivalent to 
the prize amount (or NPV of prize) 
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R&D costs  
Prizes and product 
development 
partnerships (PDPs) 
 Increase in antibacterial 
sponsor revenues due 
to lump-sum prize 
payment 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections due to 
antibacterial production 
 Added societal cost equivalent to 
the prize amount (or NPV of prize) 
Yes Yes Yes Possible [i] 
























































































































































 Decrease in revenues 
for antibacterial drug 
sponsor 
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 Decrease in revenues 
for antibacterial drug 
sponsor 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections 
 Increase in useful life of 
antibacterial (due to deferred 
antimicrobial resistance) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Vaccination 
promotion  
 Decrease in revenues 
for antibacterial drug 
sponsor 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections No No Yes Yes 
Better monitoring & 
reporting of 
infection rates & 
antibacterial drug 
resistance  
 Decrease in revenues 
for antibacterial drug 
sponsor (2nd order) 
 Reductions in number, duration, 
severity of infections 
 Increase in useful life of 
antibacterial (due to deferred 
antimicrobial resistance) - 2nd 
order 




schemes [b]  
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for antibacterial drug 
sponsor (2nd order) 
 Increase in useful life of 
antibacterial (due to deferred 
antimicrobial resistance) - 2nd 
order 
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 Increase in useful life of 
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antimicrobial resistance) - 2nd 
order 
 

























































































































































[a] IP collectively refers to patents/Data Exclusivity/Marketing Exclusivity/Patent Term Adjustments/Patent Term Extensions/Supplementary Protection 
Certificates (see Section 2.1.1 for further detail). 
[b] Can be designed to maintain/increase total reimbursement to sponsor through price adjustments 
[c] These could also simultaneously impact clinical trial costs. However, allowing both parameters to vary in the private ENPV model would lead to non-unique 
solutions for the incentive level. Thus, we limited the effect of each incentive to a single model parameter to avoid solver problems. 
[d] While these can be structured in multiple different ways, in this study, they are envisioned to be paid out sequentially upon successful completion of a phase. 
It should be noted that for rapid point of care diagnostics, there would only be three award/grant/prize stages, one for a pilot clinical study, another for a full-
scale clinical trial, and a final one for 510(k) submission to FDA. 
[e] All of the conservation incentives reduce private ENPV and hence are not examined in the model. 
[f] It might undermine value of programs to apply to all. 
[g] Vaccines and diagnostics would promote conservation, but speeding more antibacterial drugs to market might harm conservation through market dynamics. 
[h] An effective P4P system must greatly increase reimbursement across the entire antibacterial drugs class. 
[i] If paired with conservation targets. 
[j] Currently, there are no market or data exclusivity protections for rapid point-of-care diagnostics. 
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2.1 PRODUCTION INCENTIVES 
2.1.1 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection Extensions 
We use the term “intellectual property (IP) protection extensions” to encompass patent/data 
exclusivity (DE), marketing exclusivity (ME), patent term adjustments (PTAs), patent term extensions 
(PTEs), and supplementary protection certificates (SPCs); all of which serve to increase drug developer 
revenues and hence private NPV, by barring generic competition and allowing companies to charge 
consumers and insurers higher prices for innovator drugs over a longer time period. 
 Data exclusivity (DE) refers to a period of time during which generic competitors are barred 
from applying for market authorization on the basis of clinical data generated for the 
originator drug.  Though it does not legally prevent generic competitors from generating their 
own evidence to obtain marketing approval, the resources required to do so are so 
considerable that data exclusivity acts as an effective market barrier. 
 Marketing exclusivity (ME) refers to a period of time during which a generic equivalent 
cannot be approved by the FDA for market entry.  It differs from data exclusivity in that 
competitors may not enter the market even if they seek approval using their own data. 
 Patent term adjustments/extensions (PTAs and PTEs) and supplementary protection 
certificates (SPC) (in Europe) enable manufacturers to gain protection to compensate for time 
spent in the regulatory approval process.  The SPC protection takes effect after the patent 
expires and applies to a specific active ingredient that has been granted marketing 
authorization.  The period of protection is dependent on the length of time between patent 
filing and market authorization. 
It should be noted that these exclusivities are likely to differ in their value to the drug developer 
because of how much additional time is given to exclusivity.  However, it is not possible to distinguish 
among these different mechanisms within the developed analytic framework.  Hence, all of these are 
combined  under  the  generic  umbrella  of  “intellectual  property  (IP)  protection  extensions”  in  our  model.    
Further, not all of the above mechanisms are applicable to rapid point-of-care diagnostics and vaccines. 
2.1.2 Tax Incentives 
Tax incentives for antibacterial product R&D can take many forms, including (but not limited to) 
the following: 
 Tax credits: amounts deducted from tax liability, including transferrable tax credits,2 
 Tax allowances: amounts deducted from gross income to calculate taxable income, 
 Tax deferrals: delay in payment of a tax, 
                                                     
2 A transferable tax credit can be sold by the entity that has earned it to another qualified entity.  A transferable tax 
credit would enable emerging, often small, companies without any tax liability to sell the credit to established 
profitable companies. 
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 Accelerated depreciation: immediate or accelerated write-off of capital expenditures, and 
 Favorable  “patent  box”  tax  rates:  reduced  tax  rate  for  income  derived  from  patents. 
While all forms of tax incentives have the effect of increasing the net present value (NPV) of 
potential research projects by decreasing the cost of capital, they could be applied in a variety of ways to 
achieve this result.  In  general,  they  are  either  applied  to  a  developer’s current expenditures (including 
wages/salaries for research personnel and the cost of materials) or capital expenditures (cost of facilities 
and equipment).  Tax incentives may not be valuable for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which do 
not have the access to capital and high expenditures that larger companies do.  However, these incentives 
may be designed in such a way that allows SMEs to receive a refund for the excess tax credit (regardless 
of the size of their tax bill), which may then function as a research subsidy (Mossialos, et al., 2010). 
2.1.3 Modifications to the Clinical Trial Process and Approval Standards 
This incentive encompasses a number of ideas intended to streamline the clinical trial and drug 
approval processes for antibacterial drugs in order to shorten the timelines and, in turn, reduce the costs 
associated with developing these drugs.  Easing the development requirements could reduce development 
costs by shortening the time to market for these products, thereby increasing the potential returns to 
developers. 
For example, the Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) Approval Mechanism proposal 
put forth by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) is one such approach that can be 
examined in the  context  of  the  analytical  framework  developed.    Under  the  LPAD  proposal,  “…the  safety  
and effectiveness [of an antibacterial drug designed to treat serious infections] would be studied in 
substantially smaller, more rapid, and less expensive clinical trials—much like the Orphan Drug (OD) 
Program permits for other rare diseases.  LPAD products then would be narrowly indicated for use in 
small, well-defined  populations  of  patients  for  whom  the  drugs’  benefits  have  been shown to outweigh 
their  risks”  (Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2012).   
2.1.4 Grants/Awards/Prizes for Antibacterial Product Research and Development 
International-level support for research occurs primarily through public research institutions.  In 
the United States, national-level funding of research is conducted through several departments and 
agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and it’s Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR), NIH and CDC.  NIH is the primary agency responsible for 
performing and supporting basic, clinical, and translational research and its support acts as a subsidy to 
drug development, as it funds the scientific research needed to identify new target organisms and drugs 
that are effective against those targets (Laxminarayan & Malani, 2007). 
Under the ASPR, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) 
funds the development and procurement of medical countermeasures (MCMs).  The Pandemic and All-
Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) (2006) specifies that the BioShield program can be invoked for an 
infectious disease as long as the MCM is also a national security countermeasure. PAHPA created the 
BARDA to help advance R&D in response to security threats (Mossialos, et al., 2010).  
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Privately- and publicly-funded prize incentives and product development partnerships (PDPs) for 
medical innovation have flourished in recent years.  Prize incentives directly reduce R&D costs and risks 
or increase revenues.  They can take a variety of forms, including milestone monetary prizes, best entry 
tournaments, elective systems (e.g., the optional reward scheme), and others.  Under some of these 
schemes, the manufacturer retains its patent, while others require the manufacturer to relinquish the 
patent. 
In this study, we model this category of incentives as sequential payments of lump-sum amounts 
upon successful completion of a phase with the amounts increasing for later clinical trial stages. 
2.2 CONSERVATION INCENTIVES 
As depicted in Table 3, there are a number of approaches that might prolong the useful lives of 
antibacterial drugs through stewardship, appropriate use, and conservation.  All of these goals are 
important for public health.  However, from the perspective of the antibacterial drug developer, all of 
these programs reduce demand for their products and therefore reduce incentives to create new drugs.  
Some of these incentives include the following: 
 Education campaigns – Many patients continue to believe that antibacterial drugs are 
effective against common non-bacterial conditions (such as colds and influenza) and 
therefore seek antibacterial drug prescriptions from their doctors to treat these viral 
infections.  Correcting these widespread false beliefs through better public education could 
help to decrease the demand for antibacterial drugs and slow the development of resistance. 
 Improvements in hospital infection control – Reducing healthcare-associated infections can 
decrease both antibacterial demand and the incidence of antibacterial drug resistance. 
 Vaccination promotion – Vaccines for both bacterial and viral diseases, such as the 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and the influenza vaccine, can reduce disease incidence, 
bacterial coinfections, antibacterial drug demand, and antibacterial drug resistance, while also 
providing spillover benefits to non-vaccinated individuals, whose risk of infection decreases 
as more of the population are vaccinated.  Direct subsidies for research into new antibacterial 
vaccines would also reduce the demand for antibacterials drugs, delaying resistance. 
 Better monitoring and reporting of infection rates and antibacterial drug resistance (AR) – 
Surveillance of antibacterial drug resistance (AR) will improve understanding of the impacts 
of changes in antibacterial drug prescribing patterns, help identify new resistance 
mechanisms and outbreaks of resistant pathogens, assist in development of public health 
guidelines for infection control, and allow better education of health care providers and 
patients regarding AR (Laxminarayan & Malani, 2007; Mossialos, et al., 2010; Ming, Chen, 
Miller, Sexton, & Anderson, 2012).  
 Performance- and value-based reimbursement schemes – Under a performance-based 
scheme, hospital reimbursement would be tied to levels of infection and drug resistance.  
Alternatively, in a value-based reimbursement approach, existing insurance plans would 
implement a system that provides reimbursement for antibacterial drugs according to their 
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health impact, encouraging manufacturers to set their price based on the calculated impact, 
with more effective drugs being priced higher.  
As noted earlier, the conservation incentives have the effect of reducing antibacterial drug 
developer revenues and thus can be examined using the analytical framework developed by simply 
applying a percentage reduction to the total developer revenue scheme or varying percentage reductions 
to annual developer revenues.  We did not, however, analyze conservation incentives in this study. 
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Figure 1: Stylized Model of New Drug Development and Commercialization Activities 
3 ANTIBACTERIAL DRUGS 
3.1 EXPECTED NET PRESENT VALUE (ENPV) FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 
PRIVATE RETURNS 
Drug development activities include early stage research and development (R&D), pre-clinical 
and clinical research as well as supply chain related efforts (such as sample preparation, process research 
development, manufacturing plant design) (see Figure 1 for a stylized depiction of the drug development 
process).  Each of these activities involves costs and failure risks.  Thus, a rational forward looking drug 
sponsor will evaluate these costs and risks against the potential returns before beginning development of a 
drug. 
In  this  study,  we  model  the  drug  developer’s  evaluation  in  the  form  of  a  decision  tree  that looks at 
the decision process from the point of view of an expected-revenue-maximizing sponsor in the face of 
uncertainty (or risk).  
 
 
Source: Blaue, Pekny, Varma, & Bunch, 2004 
To illustrate our approach, we consider a highly simplified example adapted from Damodaran 
(2007) below - the analysis of a New Molecular Entity (NME) candidate for treating a hypothetical 
Indication X.  Assume that we are provided with the following hypothetical information:3 
                                                     
3 The figures provided are for demonstrative purposes only and do not represent a specific antibacterial NME. 
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 Pre-clinical research and development takes 5.5 years and costs around $21 million to 
identify a lead molecule.  There is a 31 percent likelihood that a lead molecule will be 
successfully identified. 
 Phase 1 trial is expected to cost $30 million and to require 100 participants to determine 
safety and dosage.  The trial is expected to last 1.5 years and there is a 54 percent likelihood 
that the drug will successfully complete the first phase.  
 Phase 2 involves testing the NME’s  effectiveness  in  treating  Indication  X  on  250  participants  
over a period of around 2.1 years.  This phase is expected to cost $45 million and the agent 
will need to show a statistically significant impact on a number of clinical endpoints to move 
on to the next phase.  There is only a 60 percent likelihood that the drug will prove successful 
in treating Indication X. 
 In Phase 3, the testing will be expanded to around 500 patients.  The phase will last 2.5 years 
and cost $210 million, and there is a 67 percent likelihood of success. 
 Upon completion of Phase 3, the sponsor will need to submit a New Drug Application (NDA) 
to the FDA paying a user fee of $2 million and there is an 85 percent likelihood of being 
approved.  The NDA/ Biologic License Application (BLA) submission decision will take 0.8 
year. 
 Given the size of the patient population and average wholesale price for similar drugs, the net 
annual returns for the NME, if it is approved, are estimated at $793 million per year for 20 
years (i.e., approximately $1.5 billion total). 
 The cost of capital for the sponsor is 11 percent.  
We can now draw the decision tree for this NME by specifying the phases, the revenues at each 
phase, and the respective success and failure probabilities (see Figure 2).  The decision tree depicted 
shows the likelihood of success at each phase and the marginal returns associated with each step.  
Because it takes time to go through the different phases of development, there is a time value effect that is 
built into the expected returns computation for each path.  The figure reflects this time value effect and 
computes the cumulative present value of returns from each path using the 11 percent cost of capital as 
the  sponsor’s  internal  rate  of  discount.   When time-discounted costs of conducting trials are subtracted 
from the present value of the returns at the end nodes, we are left with the net present value (NPV) of 
each possible outcome. 
In Figure 2, the yellow square is the root decision node of interest.  It is the point at which the 
revenue-maximizing sponsor is deciding whether or not to pursue development of the drug.  The green 
circles (event/chance nodes) represent the possibility of success or failure at each phase, with the 
probabilities associated with each possibility appearing to the left of each branch.  Finally, the red 
triangles are the end nodes.  To the right of each end node is the NPV of that outcome to the sponsor.  For 
example, if the drug completed all phases and successfully reached the market, the NPV of the cost and 
revenue streams would be $1.5 billion in this scenario.  By contrast, if the sponsor pushed forward with 
development but the drug failed at some point, the sponsor would incur the costs of the clinical trials 
without earning any revenues.  Therefore, the other outcome nodes represent negative NPVs.  
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Figure 2: Drug Development Decision Tree Depicting Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) of 
Private Returns (Values in $ Million) for a Hypothetical New Molecule X 
 
 
The dollar values appearing in bold next to the green chance nodes are calculated from right to 
left across the tree by multiplying the NPVs associated with each outcome by the probabilities of that 
outcome occurring.  These dollar values thus represent the expected NPVs (ENPVs).  For example, the 
ENPV at the start of the NDA/BLA review phase is equal to ($1.5 billion × 85 percent) + (-$118 million 
× 15 percent), or $1.3 billion.  The $1.3 billion can then be used to do the same calculation for the chance 
node at Phase 3, and so forth until the value at the first chance node can be calculated.  This number, $62 
million in this example, represents the ENPV to the sponsor of moving forward with the development 
project at the time when the decision is made to continue or abandon the new drug.  This value reflects all 
of the possibilities that can unfold over time clearly depicting the sub-optimal choices that a revenue-
maximizing developer should reject.  The decision tree also characterizes the full range of outcomes, with 
the worst case scenario being failure in the NDA review stage to the best case scenario of FDA approval. 
Postmarketing commitments, such as pediatric trials, and costs associated with supply chain 
activities, as described earlier, do not appear in Figure 2 as part of the decision tree because they do not 
play a role in determining which branch or outcome node a new drug ends up on in the same way that 
pre-clinical, Phase 1, 2, 3 trials, and NDA/BLA application process do.  However, these costs can easily 
be reflected in the values shown in the tree.4  The cost of these activities can then be discounted back to 
the start of the project (in the same way all of the other costs are) and included in the branch representing 
successful completion of applicable phases and approval of the new drug. 
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3.2 ANTIBACTERIAL DRUG PRIVATE ENPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Table 4 presents the point estimates for the private ENPV model parameters and assumptions.  
The following sections discuss the basis for these estimates in further detail. 
3.2.1 Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 
The real opportunity cost of capital represents the rate of return (net of inflation) that the drug 
sponsor would otherwise be able to earn at the same risk level as the investment in the new antibacterial 
drug that has been selected.  The cost of capital rates used by the pharmaceutical sector reported in the 
literature range from a low of 9 percent to as high as 40 percent.  For example, in their most widely cited 
study, DiMasi et al (2004) use an 11 percent discount rate based (in part) on historic returns in the 
industry.  
According to experts interviewed, the opportunity cost of capital varies significantly by drug 
sponsor-specific factors, such as new product candidate portfolio, size of company, type of company 
(pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical), as well as other exogenous factors, such as economic and 
regulatory climate for drug development projects.  While large pharmaceutical companies use rates 
ranging from 9 percent to 13 percent, the rates used by small venture-capital backed pharmaceutical 
companies tend to be much higher ranging from 20 percent to as high as 70 percent.  On the other hand, 
the rates used by biopharmaceutical companies reportedly vary from 18 percent to 24 percent.  
In the model, we use 11 percent as the average real opportunity cost of capital.  Because the 
parameter value heavily influences private ENPV outcomes, we assign a triangular probability 
distribution with a lower limit of 9 percent, an upper limit of 24 percent, and a likely point estimate of 11 
percent for sensitivity analysis purposes.  
3.2.2  Pre-clinical R&D Cost 
A direct link between pre-clinical expenditures and the specific drug that ends up being 
commercialized is difficult to establish.  For biopharmaceuticals, DiMasi and Grabowski (2007) estimate 
the average out-of-pocket cost of pre-clinical development that includes expenditures for both basic 
research and pre-clinical development at $59.9 million in 2005 dollars.  The  authors’  figures  are  based  on  
a sample of 17 compounds from a biotechnology company and are not specific to antibacterials.   
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Table 4: Private ENPV Model Parameters and Assumptions (Point Estimates) 
Indication ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP 
Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 11.0% 
Pre-clinical R&D Time (in Years) 5.5 
Pre-clinical R&D Cost $21,084,405 
Pre-clinical R&D Success Probability 35.2% 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 0.9 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Cost $9,652,500 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Success Probability 33.0% 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 1.3 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.9 1.5 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Cost $9,164,533 $8,852,794 $9,129,191 $9,588,073 $9,088,073 $15,635,029 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Success Probability 50.0% 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 1.8 3.3 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Cost $41,699,750 $33,640,993 $38,840,993 $50,558,507 $43,758,507 $101,375,897 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Success Probability 67.0% 
FDA New Drug Application (NDA) Review Time (in Years) 0.8 
NDA/BLA Submission Cost $1,958,800 
NDA/BLA Success Probability 85.0% 
Sample preparation for animal/human studies $2,676,066 
Process research/development/design $26,760,658 
Plant design $13,380,329 
Plant build $82,958,039 
Non-clinical Work Time (in Years) 4.0 2.6 3.0 3.5 3.5 5.5 
Non-clinical Work Cost $3,700,000 
Post-approval Pediatric Trial Time (in Years) 3.0 
Post-approval Pediatric Trial Cost $10,000,000 
Time to generic entry upon FDA Approval (in Years) 12 
Percentage Reduction in Revenues due to Generic Competition 50.0% 
Total Product Life (in Years) 20 
Total Market Size (in $ million) $2,950 $6,590 $7,970 $4,660 $6,540 $3,470 
Product Success Probability 60% 
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More recently, using data from Eli Lilly and Company along with industry benchmarks, Paul et al 
(2010) estimate the average out-of-pocket pre-clinical expenditures at $18.5 million in 2008 dollars for 
the pharmaceutical industry overall, which is the sum of expenditures associated with target-to-hit ($1 
million), hit-to-lead ($2.5 million), lead optimization ($10 million) and pre-clinical ($5 million) stages.  
In  contrast  to  the  DiMasi  et  al  (2004)  figure,  Paul  et  al.’s  (2010)  estimate  excludes  costs  associated with 
the earliest phase of discovery research prior to target selection. 
While some experts contend that drug sponsors only include the pre-clinical stage expenditures 
but not those incurred prior to this stage in their private ENPV calculations, others argue that all early 
stage R&D expenditures enter into the decision making process.  Given that the research required to 
identify and validate a given target is highly variable and difficult to quantify, we only consider the cash 
outlays needed for target-to-hit, hit-to-lead, lead optimization, and pre-clinical development in this model.  
Using figures provided by Paul et al (2010), we estimate the total cost of pre-clinical research at $21.1 
million in 2012 dollars.  For sensitivity analysis, we assume that the pre-clinical cost parameter follows a 
triangular probability distribution with a lower limit of $19.0 million, an upper limit of $23.2 million, and 
a mean of $21.1 million (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Pre-clinical R&D Cost Estimates (in 2012 $ million) 
Source [a] Min Mean Max Comments 
DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007 N/A $76.9 N/A Includes basic research and all costs associated with 
stages prior to clinical 
Paul et al., 2010 N/A $21.1 N/A Includes costs associated with target-to-hit, hit-to-
lead, lead optimization, and pre-clinical stages 
ERG $19.0 $21.1 $23.2 Includes costs for the target-to-hit, hit-to-lead, lead 
optimization, and pre-clinical stages (screening to 
IND) but not very early stage R&D 
N/A = Not available 
[a] The figures are inflated to 2012 dollars using the CPI inflator. 
[b] Italics indicate that the estimate is extrapolated based on the provided range estimate. 
3.2.3 Clinical Phase and NDA/BLA Submission Costs 
There is very limited data on phase costs by therapeutic class in the public domain.  The most 
widely cited estimates are from DiMasi et al (2004) and are based on confidential data collected from 10 
pharmaceutical companies.  For anti-infectives, DiMasi et al (2004) report mean clinical trial phase costs 
of $23 million, $20 million, and $137 million in 2000 dollars for Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3, 
respectively.  As acknowledged by the authors, these phase costs are largely driven by the relatively high 
development costs for antiretroviral drugs for treatment of persons with HIV/AIDS included in the anti-
infectives category.  
Our discussions with experts and drug sponsors that specialize in antibacterial drug development 
yielded estimates that are widely different than those of DiMasi et al (2004).  According to experts and 
company representatives interviewed, current Phase 1 costs for antibacterial drugs range from $7.3 to 
$12.0 million which includes data management and statistical analysis costs.  Further, our interviewees 
noted that Phase 2 and Phase 3 costs are likely to vary by the type of indication the new drug is designed 
to treat.  Among the six indications considered in this study, Phase 2 and 3 costs are likely to be highest 
for HABP/VABP around $15.0 million and $100.0 million, respectively.  This is primarily because 1) 
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VABP is difficult to clearly define and diagnose and 2) in order to enroll sufficient number of VABP 
patients in a trial, a large number of trial sites are required, thereby increasing trial costs significantly.  
Table 6 shows the clinical phase costs and their likely ranges used in this study.  The DiMasi et al (2004) 
estimates are presented in the same table for comparison purposes only. 
Table 6: Clinical Phase Cost Estimates (in 2012 $ million), by Indication 




1 DiMasi et al (2004) [a] $36.6 






2 DiMasi et al (2004) [a] $31.8 
ERG [d] Min [e] $7.4 $7.12  $7.28  $7.68  $7.28  $12.48  
Mean $9.2 $8.9 $9.1 $9.6 $9.1 $15.6 




3 DiMasi et al (2004) [a] $218.0 
ERG [d] Min [e] $33.36  $26.88  $31.04  $40.48  $35.04  $81.12  
Mean $41.7 $33.6 $38.8 $50.6 $43.8 $101.4 
Max [e] $50.04  $40.32  $46.56  $60.72  $52.56  $121.68  
[a] The figures are inflated to 2012 dollars using the CPI inflator. 
[b] Italics indicate that the estimate is extrapolated based on the provided range or point estimate. 
[c] Phase 2 and Phase 3 trial costs for ABOM is extrapolated by averaging the costs for ABSSSI, CABP, CIAI, and 
CUTI for the respective phases. 
[d] Costs are based on outsourcing expenditures plus an average of 4.5 FTEs for the duration of the clinical trial 
phase to the drug sponsor to manage project outsourcing with CRO.  The cost per FTE is estimated at $94,000 per 
annum based on earnings data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
[e] The interval around the point estimate is assumed to be ±20%. 
The reported new drug application fee for those drug or biologic product applications requiring 
clinical data is $1,958,800 for fiscal year 2013.  Thus, we use this figure as the NDA/BLA submission 
cost in the model.  
3.2.4 Pre-clinical, Clinical, and NDA/BLA Submission Phase Durations 
Private ENPV is dependent on the duration of each phase and the distribution of out-of-pocket 
costs throughout each phase.  Often times, there are overlaps as well as gaps among phases.  For example, 
while Phase 1 may last for nearly 20 months, a company may initiate Phase 2 trials after having 
completed its single ascending dose tier studies within the first 12 months of Phase 1.  There are a number 
of published studies that provide estimates of average phase durations for pharmaceutical development 
accounting for these phase overlaps and gaps (see Table 7).  None of these reported estimates, however, 
are  specific  to  antibacterials  which  may  have  a  different  phase  duration  profile  than  the  “average  
pharmaceutical.” 
Based on the published information and discussion with experts and drug sponsors, the average 
pre-clinical and Phase 1 durations are set at 66.0 months (i.e., 5.5 years) and 10.5 months (i.e., 0.9 year), 
respectively. Further, assuming most new antibacterials will get priority review by the FDA, we estimate 
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the NDA approval phase duration at 9.0 months (i.e., 0.75 year) in the model.5  Unlike pre-clinical, Phase 
1 and NDA approval times, however, the timelines for Phase 2 and Phase 3 studies are expected to vary 
across the six different indications.   
Table 7: Pre-clinical, Clinical, and NDA/BLA Application Average Phase Durations (in Months) 
Source Pre-clinical Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 NDA/BLA 
DiMasi et al., 2003 N/A 21.6 25.7 30.5 N/A 
DiMasi et al., 2004 [c] N/A 50.5 12.5 
DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007 [a] 52.0 19.5 29.3 32.9 N/A 
Adams & Brantner, 2006 [b] N/A 19.0 30.0 30.0 15.8 
Paul et al., 2010 66.0 18.0 30.0 30.0 18.0 
Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004 N/A 19.7 29.9 47.0 N/A 
ERG      




     ABSSSI 10.0 12.5 
     CABP 15.0 12.5 
     CIAI 11.0 21.5 
     CUTI 11.0 21.5 
     HABP/VABP 18.0 39.0 
[a] The figures are applicable to biopharmaceuticals. 
[b] The reported figures only include those based on the Pharmaprojects database. 
[c] The reported figures are specific to anti-infectives. 
Depending on the indication, Phase 2 and Phase 3 studies are expected to last from 10.0 to 18.0 
months and 12.5 to 39.0 months, respectively (see Table 7).  For sensitivity analysis, we again assume 
that each phase duration parameter has a triangular probability distribution with the following bounds: 
 Pre-clinical: Lower bound of 52.0 months, upper bound of 72.0 months 
 Phase 1: Lower bound of 9.0 months, upper bound of 21.6 months 
 Phase 2 
- ABOM: Lower bound of 12.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
- ABSSSI: Lower bound of 9.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
- CABP: Lower bound of 12.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
- CIAI: Lower bound of 10.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
- CUTI: Lower bound of 10.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
- HABP/VABP: Lower bound of 16.0 months, upper bound of 30.0 months 
 Phase 3 
- ABOM: Lower bound of 20.0 months, upper bound of 47.0 months 
- ABSSSI: Lower bound of 10.0 months, upper bound of 47.0 months 
- CABP: Lower bound of 10.0 months, upper bound of 47.0 months 
- CIAI: Lower bound of 17.0 months, upper bound of 47.0 months 
- CUTI: Lower bound of 17.0 months, upper bound of 47.0months 
- HABP/VABP: Lower bound of 35.0 months, upper bound of 47.0 months 
 NDA Approval: Lower bound of 6.0 months, upper bound of 12.5 months  
                                                     
5 Under GAIN, Antibacterial or antifungal drugs designated as Qualifying Infectious Disease Products will receive a 
priority review. The nine-month timeline used in our model reflects a slightly longer approval time given historical 
data and thus does not reflect the review and approval goals for FDA. 
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3.2.5 Pre-clinical, Clinical, NDA/BLA Submission Success Probabilities 
Table 8 presents the different phase success probabilities (also referred to as phase transition 
probabilities) reported in the literature and gleaned from discussions with experts and drug sponsors.  
Estimates reported in DiMasi et al., (2004) and DiMasi et al., (2010) are applicable to anti-infectives 
whereas the remaining figures from published studies apply to all pharmaceuticals.  Based on the 
collective body of information, we use the following success rates by phase in the model: 
 Pre-clinical: Lower bound of 17.5%, upper bound of 69.0%, likely point estimate of 35.2% 
 Phase 1: Lower bound of 25.0%, upper bound of 83.7%, likely point estimate of 33.0% 
 Phase 2: Lower bound of 34.0%, upper bound of 74.0%, likely point estimate of 50.0% 
 Phase 3: Lower bound of 31.4%, upper bound of 78.6%, likely point estimate of 67.0% 
 NDA/BLA Approval: Lower bound of 83.0%, upper bound of 99.0%, likely point estimate of 
85.0% 
Table 8: Pre-clinical, Clinical, and NDA/BLA Submission Success Probabilities (in %) 
Source Pre-clinical Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 NDA?BLA 
DiMasi et al., 2003 N/A N/A 71.0% 31.4% N/A 
DiMasi et al., 2004 [d] N/A N/A 66.1% 38.2% N/A 
DiMasi & Grabowski, 2007 [a] N/A 83.7% 56.3% 64.2% N/A 
DiMasi et al., 2010 [d] N/A 58.2% 52.2% 78.6% 100.0% 
Adams & Brantner, 2006 [b] 31.0% N/A 74.0% 46.0% N/A 
Paul et al., 2010 69.0% 54.0% 34.0% 70.0% 91.0% 
Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004 N/A 81.0% 57.0% 57.0% N/A 
Hay et al., 2011 N/A 67.0% 41.0% 65.0% 83.0% 
ERG 35.2% 33.0% 50.0% 67.0% 85.0% 
[a] The figures are applicable to biopharmaceuticals. 
[b] The reported figures only include those based on the Pharmaprojects database. 
[c] The figure reflects time for an accelerated FDA approval. 
[d] The reported figures are specific to anti-infectives. 
It should be noted that the average Phase 1 success rate selected for the model is much lower than 
the figures reported in the literature. According to experts interviewed, this high failure rate is primarily 
attributable to higher toxicity and tolerance issues for antibacterials compared to other therapeutic areas.  
Often, studies require use of high doses of the antibacterial to treat resistant infections resulting in toxicity 
issues for the trial subjects.  Unlike other therapeutic areas, such as oncology, where the efficacious 
exposure may not be determined till Phase 3 trials are completed, the efficacious exposures are known 
early on for antibacterials, leading to early rather than late failures.  Because we did not have any 
information on how success rates may vary by indication, we apply the same rates across all of the six 
indications under consideration. 
3.2.6 Costs of Supply Chain Activities 
The drug sponsor needs to undertake a variety of additional activities concurrently with clinical 
development, including sample preparation, process research, process development, process design, and 
plant design and construction.  As was depicted in Figure 1, sponsors initially need to focus on preparing 
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sufficient amount of drug sample for use in animal and human studies.  Depending on the active 
ingredient(s), this could cost from $3,500 to over $80,000 per kilogram according to some experts.  Upon 
start of clinical research, the focus shifts to developing a process for commercialization.  This includes a 
pilot facility that provides data for plant design and larger quantities of drug samples for Phase 3 trials.  
While Phase 3 is ongoing, the sponsor usually begins plant design or starts investigating other 
arrangements (e.g., contract facilities, licensing, etc.) for manufacturing the drug.  Because of significant 
failure rates in late stage clinical trials, sponsors often cannot commit themselves to building a 
manufacturing  plant  until  they  are  certain  of  the  product’s  commercialization  success.   Thus, typically 
upon successful completion of Phase 3 trials, plans are launched to build a new manufacturing facility or 
modify existing facilities.   
Table 9 below presents the cost estimates for each of these supply chain activities as available 
from Blau et al. (2004).  The figures are based on historical information on nine new drug candidates 
provided by a large pharmaceutical company to the study authors.  We use the reported estimates in our 
model by inflating the 2004 dollar figures to 2012 dollars with the CPI inflator. 
Table 9: Product Supply Chain Activity Costs (in 2012 $ million) as Available from (Blaue, Pekny, 
Varma, & Bunch, 2004) [a] 
Parameter Min Mean Max Comment 
Sample preparation for 
animal/human studies 
$2.4 $2.7 $2.9 Assumes that out-of-pocket costs for the activity are evenly 
distributed across all clinical phases. 
Process 
research/development/design 
$18.7 $26.8 $34.8 Assumes that out-of-pocket costs for the activity are evenly 
distributed across Phases 1 and 2 
Plant design $10.7 $13.4 $16.1 Assumes that 75% of out-of-pocket costs for the activity are 
spent during Phase 3 and the remaining 25% during the 
NDA/BLA submission/approval phase. 
Plant build $69.6 $83.0 $96.3 Assumes that out-of-pocket costs for the activity are expended 
during the NDA/BLA submission/approval phase. 
[a]  Authors’  figures  are  inflated  to  2012  dollars  using  the  CPI  inflator. 
3.2.7 Non-clinical Work Costs and Duration 
Sponsors also need to conduct non-clinical work starting with the beginning of Phase 2 through 
product launch.  These involve toxicological studies in up to 2 species that include qualification of final 
synthetic processes, reproductive toxicity studies, and susceptibility test development.  According to 
experts and drug sponsors, the cost of all such non-clinical work can range from $3.4 to $4.0 million. In 
the model, we estimate the average cost of non-clinical work at $3.7 million. 
3.2.8 Post-approval Pediatric Pharmacokinetic/Pharmacodynamic and Safety Study 
Costs and Duration  
The Pediatric Research Equity Act (Public Law 108-155) (PREA), requires the conduct of 
pediatric studies for certain drug and biological products.  Specifically, PREA requires new drug 
applications (NDAs) and biologics licensing applications (BLAs) (or supplements to applications) for a 
new active ingredient, new indication, new dosage form, new dosing regimen, or new route of 
administration to contain a pediatric assessment unless the applicant has obtained a waiver or deferral (see 
section 505B(a) of the Act) (FDA, 2005).  Thus, drug sponsors often need to conduct pharmacokinetic 
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and safety studies for the pediatric population post-FDA approval.  According to experts and drug 
sponsors interviewed, these studies could last up to 3 years and cost approximately $10.0 million on 
average.  For sensitivity analysis, we again assume that the cost of post-approval pediatric studies has a 
triangular distribution with a lower bound of $8.0 million and an upper bound of $12.0 million. 
3.2.9 Average Time to Generic Entry upon FDA Approval 
We estimate the average time to generic entry upon obtaining FDA approval for the drug at 12 
years based on a recent study by Grabowski et al. (2011).  For sensitivity analysis, we employ a triangular 
distribution with endpoints of 10 and 14 years, respectively. 
3.2.10 Percentage Reduction in Revenues due to Generic Competition 
According to Berndt & Aitken (2010), brand name drugs lose between 5 to 45 percent of their 
market to generic competition within their first full calendar year after generic entry into the market.  
Other reported estimates in the published literature range from 25 percent to as high as 75 percent 
reductions in sales revenue after generic entry into the market.  Further, depending on the therapeutic 
area, the generic market share increases range from 60 to as high as 96 percent within five years after 
market entry (Berndt & Aitken, 2010).6  For the model, we estimate the expected reduction in revenues 
after generic entry at 50 percent.  Because revenues in out years contribute very little to private ENPV 
due to discounting, we keep the generic entry market share at 50 percent for the remaining market life of 
the new antibacterial rather than increasing it over time.  For the sensitivity analysis, we assume that the 
figure has a triangular distribution with a lower bound of 25 percent and an upper bound of 75 percent. 
3.2.11 Total Product Life 
Similar to DiMasi et al. (2004), we use 20 years to characterize the average life cycle of a new 
drug upon market approval.  Even though the expected revenues from sales in years beyond 20 contribute 
very little to private ENPV due to discounting, the model allows the user to vary this parameter for what-
if scenario analysis if needed. 
3.2.12 Product Launch Success Probability 
According to Griffin (1997), only about 60 percent of new product launches end up being 
commercially successful.  Using this as our basis, we assume that there is a 60 percent chance that the 
novel antibacterial drug market share would be 27.1 percent and a 40 percent (= 1 – 0.60) chance that it 
would be 12.3 percent.  For sensitivity analysis, we use a triangular distribution for the product success 
probability with a lower bound of 40 percent and an upper bound of 80 percent. 
                                                     
6 The figures represent select therapeutic areas; calcium channel blockers, lipid-regulators, and anti-epileptics. 
Comparative figures for antibacterials are not available in the published literature. 
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3.2.13 Total Market Size 
As noted in Section 1.3, we obtained data on drug expenditures from IMS Health through  FDA’s  
third party agreement.  Based on antibacterial drugs approved for the treatment of each of the six 
indications, IMS Health provided data on total sales of these drugs across all indications by formulation 
(oral or IV) for the years 2007 to 2011.  Using these data, we estimate market size based on 2011 sales in 
three different ways: 
 Estimate 1: Total sales of antibacterial drugs that are in the formulation of interest (i.e., oral 
or IV) labeled to treat the indication. 
 Estimate 2: Total sales of all antibacterial drugs in Estimate 1, plus other formulations of the 
antibacterial drugs in Estimate 1, plus any other antibacterial drugs (in any formulation) 
approved to treat the indication. 
 Estimate 3: Total sales of all antibacterial drugs in Estimate 2 plus any antibacterial drugs that 
compete with antibacterial drugs in Estimate 2 for treating other indications (i.e., if a drug 
included in Estimate 2 is also used to treat another indication, all other drugs used to treat that 
other indication are added to the total sales calculation for this final estimate).  Due to the 
extent of overlap among drugs used to treat these indications, Estimate 3 is the same across 
all indications considered ($9.23 billion).  
The three estimates are intended to reflect differing visions of drug manufacturers as they 
consider potential market size.  The smallest estimate is for the drug and formulation specifically under 
development, which represents the most conservative or narrowly defined market vision.  The medium 
estimate represents the larger potential market for treating the same indications, but also reflects the 
possibility that the NME can be formulated for oral administration as well.  The largest estimate 
represents all potential antibacterial drugs with which the NME might compete if it can also be approved 
to treat other indications.  Table 10 presents the total market size estimates for each indication under 
consideration.  The lists of drugs used for each type of estimate are included in Appendix A. 
Table 10: Estimates of Total Market Size, by Indication (in $ Million) 
Estimate ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP 
1 $2,720 $3,070 $2,290 $2,530 $5,760 $1,780 
2 $2,950 $6,590 $7,970 $4,660 $6,540 $3,470 
3 $9,230 $9,230 $9,230 $9,230 $9,230 $9,230 
Source: (IMS Health, 2012) 
For the model, we assume that the total market size for each indication has a uniform distribution 
with Estimate 1 and Estimate 3 constituting the lower and upper bounds, respectively. Additionally, 
Estimate 2 serves as our point estimate in the model.  
3.2.14 Expected Market Share at Peak Year Sales  
The rate and extent of market penetration for pharmaceutical products depend on the maturity of 
the market as well as product characteristics (IMS Health, 2010).  Significantly, innovative products that 
FINAL APRIL 15, 2014 
 3-13 
face no or little competition enjoy quicker sales growth compared to commoditized products.  According 
to data from IMS Health, a differentiated product could potentially capture around 27 percent of the 
market at its  peak  year  sales  point  whereas  a  commodity  product’s  market  share  at  its  peak  year  sales  
point may not be half as large (around 12 percent of market share). 
If the new antibacterial drug is expected to be significantly better (in terms of safety and/or 
efficacy) than existing drugs in the same market, we assume a peak year sales market share of 27 percent 
based  on  the  “differentiated”  market  share  curve  provided in IMS Health (2010).  If, on the other hand, 
the new antibacterial drug is not substantially superior to existing therapies, we assume a peak year sales 
market  share  of  12  percent  based  on  the  “commodity”  market  share  curve  provided in the same source. 
3.2.15 Market Uptake for a New Antibacterial Drug over Time 
Table 11 presents sales data on Cubicin (daptomycin,) an antibacterial drug launched in the U.S. 
in 2003.  Cubicin is indicated for the treatment of complicated skin and skin structure infections (cSSSI) 
and Staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infections, including cases caused by methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).  As can be observed from the figure, it takes an antibacterial drug much 
longer to achieve peak year sales compared to other drugs.  According to Shlaes (2010), healthcare 
providers have little incentive to use the antibacterial drug unless it addresses an immediate antibacterial 
drug resistance problem.  Physicians will restrain their use of the new drug to avoid rapid emergence of 
resistance to the new agent thereby slowing down market uptake. 
In the model, assuming no real change in antibacterial drug reimbursement, we use the rate of 
uptake reported in Table 11 as the typical rate for a novel antibacterial drug.  Assuming that the novel 
drug would be able to capture between 27 percent and 12 percent of the total market (see previous Section 
3.2.14 for a discussion on the basis for these numbers) when it reaches its peak year sales. 
Table 12 presents the market size estimates from launch year to peak year sales years which is 
reached approximately 10 years after product launch. 
Table 11: Annual Total Net Revenues for CUBICIN from Launch (2003) to 2012 
Year Total Net Revenues Year-to-Year % Change 
2003 $3.7 0% 
2004 $68.1 1741% 
2005 $120.6 77% 
2006 $194.7 61% 
2007 $294.6 51% 
2008 $433.6 47% 
2009 $562.1 30% 
2010 $636.4 13% 
2011 $754.0 18% 
2012 [a] $915.0 21% 
Source: Cubist, 2013 
[a] The figure is the midpoint of the reported range of $900 to $930 million.  
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Figure 3: Estimated Private ENPVs by Indication for a New Antibacterial Drug (in $ Million) 







ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP
Private ENPV -$3 $27 $37 $9 $22 -$4
Table 12: Expected Market Share Estimates over Time for a New Antibacterial Drug 
Year 




Share [b] Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 (Launch) 0.05% 0.11% 
60% 
0.07% 
2 0.87% 1.91% 1.29% 
3 1.57% 3.47% 2.33% 
4 2.57% 5.68% 3.81% 
5 3.92% 8.64% 5.81% 
6 5.79% 12.77% 8.58% 
7 7.52% 16.59% 11.15% 
8 8.52% 18.80% 12.63% 
9 10.10% 22.30% 14.98% 
10 12.27% 27.08% 18.19% 
[a] See Section 3.2.12 for further discussion on the basis for this parameter 
[b] The expected market share is computed as: (Lower Bound % × [1 – 60%]) + (Upper Bound % × 60%) 
3.3 PRIVATE ENPV ESTIMATES BY INDICATION 
Figure 3 presents the estimated private ENPVs by indication for a new antibacterial drug.  As can 
be observed from the figure, the private ENPVs for both ABOM and HABP/VABP are lower than zero, 
indicating that expected returns from developing new antibacterials for the treatment of these indications 
are lower than development costs.  According to our model, the expected return to developing a new 
antibacterial for the treatment of CABP is highest ($37 million), followed by ABSSSI ($27 million) and 
CUTI ($22 million).  All of these figures assume no change in antibacterial drug reimbursement 
methodologies. 
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ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP
Private ENPV -$3 $27 $37 $9 $22 -$4
Figure 4: Sensitivity of Estimated Private ENPVs by Indication for a New Antibacterial Drug (in $ 
Million) - Error Bars Represent 90% Confidence Bounds 
To assess the sensitivity of our private ENPV results to model parameters and assumptions 
utilized, we conducted a Monte Carlo analysis in which the point estimates reported in Table 4 were 
replaced by distribution of values (the probability distributions used and the applicable functional 
parameters are discussed in those sections applicable to the model parameter above).  Table 13 and Figure 
4 present the results of this sensitivity analysis.  In the figure, the error bars correspond to the 90 percent 
confidence bounds.  As can be observed, there is wide variation in the estimated private ENPV values 
across the different indications.  The primary drivers for the observed wide range of results are 
attributable to the following model parameters in order of importance: 
 Total market size, 
 Real opportunity cost of capital, and 
 Total time to market. 
Table 13: Private ENPV Sensitivity Results (Figures are in $ Million) 
Indication Private ENPV (in $ Million) 90% Lower Bound Mean 90% Upper Bound 
ABOM -$18.8 -$2.7 $215.1 
ABSSSI -$15.8 $27.1 $198.9 
CABP -$17.6 $37.4 $330.0 
CIAI -$18.0 $8.9 $222.5 
CUTI -$16.3 $21.9 $213.0 
HABP/VABP -$23.5 -$4.5 $126.7 
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3.4 THRESHOLD ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE OPTIONS 
We considered each incentive identified in Section 2 in the context of our private ENPV 
framework.  This threshold analysis involved calculating the level of each incentive (in dollars) that 
would equate the private ENPV to $100 million for a drug sponsor that is at the start of pre-clinical phase.  
This  threshold  represents  the  developer’s  opportunity  cost  of  engaging  in  R&D  for  a  new drug.  For 
sponsors at later stages of drug development, levels of incentives will likely be different. While the 
selection of a $100 million threshold value is somewhat arbitrary, the figure is comparable to the figures 
used in other similar analysis and has been indicated as being the tipping point for smaller companies by 
some of the experts interviewed for the study.  Figure 5 depicts the amounts needed to achieve a $100 
million private ENPV at the start of pre-clinical phase across the different indications studied.  As can be 
observed, the level of the incentive valued at the start of pre-clinical phase needs to be $104 million to 
induce a drug sponsor to begin development of an antibacterial drug designed to treat HABP/VABP. On 
the other hand, for CABP, the level of the incentive needed is $63 million.  
Table 14 presents the different incentive values needed to get to the threshold of $100 million for 
each of the indications.  It is important to note that the estimated incentive levels are geared towards 
encouraging a drug sponsor that is at the start of pre-clinical phase (i.e., model frame of reference).  The 
extent and magnitude of the incentives needed for those sponsors that may be at different points along the 
decision tree (e.g., start of Phase 3), are expected to decrease closer the sponsor is to a successful product 
launch.  Moreover, the inclusion of the pre-clinical phase, which is the longest at 5.5 years, heavily 
influences our estimates.  Some of the other key findings from the analysis include the following: 
 Intellectual property (IP) extensions are not sufficient by themselves to incentivize a drug 
sponsor that is at the start of pre-clinical phase.  This is primarily due to the effect of 
discounting, whereby the product revenues in out years contribute increasingly less to the net 
present value.  
 The percentage reduction in the cost of capital needed through tax incentives ranges from 33 
percent (ABSSSI) to 81 percent (CUTI) from the baseline level of 11 percent.  For ABOM, 
CIAI, and HABP/VABP, even a zero cost of capital is insufficient to reach a $100 million 
private ENPV.  
 Across the different indications, the total time to market varies from 9 years (ABSSSI) to 
around 12 years (HABP/VABP).  Decreasing the overall time to market through 
modifications to clinical trial process and approval standards is insufficient for ABOM, CIAI, 
and HABP/VABP. For the remaining three indications (ABSSSI, CABP, and CUTI), the total 
time to market needs to reduce significantly to 2 to 4 years from its current level of 9 to 10 
years to incentivize those drug sponsors at the start of pre-clinical phase. 
 Grant/award/prize amounts increase substantially if paid out at later stages of clinical 
development.  This is due to multiple factors, time discounting being one of them. As the 
drug sponsor moves along the decision tree depicted in Figure 2, clinical research costs and 
hence risks also increase. 






















ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP
Private ENPV -$3 $27 $37 $9 $22 -$4
Difference b/w $100 M and 
Private ENPV $103 $73 $63 $91 $78 $104
Figure 5: Difference between $100 Million Threshold and Estimated Private ENPV, by Indication 
(in $ Million) 
 Principal-agent problems might be relevant for early stage R&D grants/prizes/awards as there 
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Table 14: Incentive Values Needed to Get to the $100 Million Threshold for Private ENPV for a Sponsor at the Beginning of Pre-clinical 
Phase 
Incentive Model Parameter Baseline ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP 
Intellectual Property (IP) Extensions [a] Time to Generic Entry (in Years) 12 N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S N/S 
Tax Incentives Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 11% N/S 2.4% 7.4% N/S 2.1% N/S 
Modifications to the Clinical Trial Process and Approval 
Standards 
Total Time to Market (in 
Years) Varies N/S ~3.5 ~4.0 N/S ~2.0 N/S 
Grants/Award/Prizes Paid out Sequentially (in $ Million) [c]         
     Pre-clinical [b]  $0 $98 $59 $46 $79 $53 $103 
     Phase 1 [b]  $0 $98 $76 $67 $89 $86 $103 
     Phase 2 [b]  $0 $196 $165 $159 $203 $223 $207 
     Phase 3 [b]  $0 $586 $495 $477 $617 $694 $621 
     NDA/BLA Approval [b]  $0 $147 $124 $119 $154 $173 $155 
N/S = No solution 
[a] IP collectively refers to patents/DE/ME/PTAs/PTEs/SPCs. The example is more applicable to patent extensions, however. 
[b] Because five different grant/award/prize amounts are solved for simultaneously, there are no unique solutions for the computed threshold values. 
[c] The amounts are shown by phase of development and would need to be paid out sequentially.  For example, in order to achieve the $100 million threshold 
for ABSSSI sequential payments (in millions of dollars) of $59, $76, $165, $495, and $124 would be required at each successfully completed phase of 
development listed in the table for a total payout of $919 million dollars over time. 
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3.5 EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE (EPV) FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SOCIAL 
RETURNS 
In addition to estimating the private expected net present value (ENPV) of a new antibacterial 
drug to the sponsor, we also need to consider the expected net present value (ENPV) of the new 
antibacterial drug to society as a whole.  The social ENPV considers the societal costs and benefits of 
these drugs. From the perspective of economic efficiency, providing incentives to private individuals to 
develop new antibacterial drugs makes sense if the social ENPV of these drugs is positive, but the private 
ENPV is insufficient for sponsors to produce these drugs.  
The methodology we employed for evaluating social ENPV for each of the six indications 
involved the following steps: 
Step 1 – Estimate the Value of the New Antibacterial Drug to the Individual.  We estimate the 
burden of experiencing an illness to the individual for each indication we study.  We consider two 
potential cases for each illness: 
 Morbidity – the individual becomes sick, then returns to full health, and 
 Mortality – the individual dies as a result of the disease 
To measure the burden of morbidity, we use Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs).  QALYs 
measure the equivalent number of years of life in perfect health lost as a result of the illness, and are 
widely  considered  to  provide  some  measure  of  a  patient’s  lost  “utility”  or  preference due to illness 
(although economists might argue that it is not derived from a well-defined utility function).  Intuitively, 
the  QALY  weight  is  a  preference  ranking  bounded  by  0  and  1  that  reflects  a  person’s  state  of  health  (1  
signifies perfect health, and 0 indicates health equivalent to being dead).7  We estimate two key data 
elements: 1) the QALY weight, and 2) the average duration of the illness.  Tufts Medical Center 
maintains  a  searchable  online  “Cost-Effectiveness  Analysis  Registry”  that  includes QALY weights (Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis Registry); which is where we obtained weights to use for each indication.  We 
then adjusted these weights by period of illness using the following equation, which represents the 
reduction in QALYs multiplied by the percent of a year during which the illness is experienced:8, 9 
                                                     
7 It is possible to conceive of cases in which the health state of a living person is zero, or even negative, however the 
intuitive explanation provided here is adequate for our current purposes. 
 
8 The  key  assumption  here  is  that  the  quality  of  the  patient’s  life  is  reduced  by  the  value  of  the  QALY  weight.    For  
example, a patient suffering from a preexisting condition might have an initial health state value that is less than 1; 
however,  as  long  as  the  illness  further  reduces  the  patient’s  health  state  by  the  value  of  the  QALY  weight,  the  
calculation is still correct.  It is plausible that the combined effect of two or more health conditions will reduce the 
patient’s  quality  of  life  by  less  than  the  sum  of  the  individual  QALY  weights,  in  which  case  this  calculation  will  
overestimate the reduction in QALYs; however we did not have data to support such adjustments. 
 
9 Assuming an initial health value of 1 will overestimate benefits as most individuals are not in full health. 
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Lost  QALYs  per  Patient  =  (1-­QALY  Weight)×Number  of  Days  Ill
365
 
Average duration of illness was obtained from the literature on each indication as described in 
further detail in the following sections below.  
The data elements required to calculate lost QALYs for patients who die are: 1) the age at which 
a patient dies due to the infection, and 2) the typical life expectancy for the age at which the patient dies.  
In the case of death, the QALY weight is zero, so the loss of QALYs for a single patient for a single year 
of life would be 1.0, and the period over which the QALYs were lost would be the years of life lost.10  
Step 2 – Estimate Annual Societal Burden by Extrapolating the Individual Burden.  To calculate 
societal burden, we estimated the total number of illnesses and deaths associated with each of the 
indications in the U.S. per year.  In most cases, the total number of cases per year was available or derived 
from the literature on each indication.  Using population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, we 
converted the total number of episodes (by age group, where possible) to rates and applied those rates to 
2011 population figures to obtain a total number of cases for the year 2011 for all indications (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2008).  Additionally, mortality rates for each indication were either derived from the 
clinical literature or calculated using the Compressed Mortality File (from Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, available online from CDC WONDER). 
Step 3 – Monetize Societal Burden of Illness.  We monetize our estimates of QALYs lost by using 
the value of a statistical life year (VSLY).  The VSLY is based on the value of a statistical life (VSL).  
The VSL is a measure of how much consumers are willing to pay for a small reduction in their probability 
of dying.  This small amount is then aggregated over the probabilities to give the VSL.  For example, if 
consumers are willing to pay $400 to reduce their risk of dying by one in 20,000, then the VSL is 
$8,000,000 (= $400 × 20,0000).  We then extrapolate the VSLY from the VSL by amortizing it at a 3 
percent real discount rate over the remaining years of expected life.  Thus, we applied the value of that 
year of life to the duration of the illness and the loss of utility from that illness to place a monetary value 
on the lost QALYs.  This approach is clearly a mere approximation of WTP and has been criticized in the 
past for  using  a  constant  estimate  of  VSL  instead  of  allowing  VSL  to  vary  over  a  person’s  life  span.   
Although still controversial, in the absence of direct, valid estimates of WTP, this approach provides a 
usable alternative.  
Step 4 – Calculate Net Present Value (NPV) of the Total Societal Burden of Disease for the 
Projected Useful Life of the New Antibacterial (i.e., 20 Years).  Using the annual monetized societal 
burden of disease computed in Step 3, we estimated the 20-year burden by adjusting for population 
growth and using a 3 percent social discount rate. 
Step 5 – Estimate Reduction in Total Societal Burden of Disease due to the New Antibacterial 
Drug.  From a societal perspective, social benefits accrue only if the new drug offers a therapeutic benefit 
over existing drugs in terms of reductions in morbidity or mortality.  Therefore, we assumed that the new 
                                                     
10 This method is an overestimate of the QALYs lost due to death because absent the illness that caused death, the 
individual would not have lived for the rest of his or her life in a state of perfect health. 
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antibacterial drug must somehow be an improvement over existing drugs: patients get better faster, and/or 
patients that are resistant to existing drugs will not be resistant to the new drug. 
To derive this benefit, we used estimates of 1) percentage of patients that are not effectively 
treated by existing drugs, and 2) percentage increase in disease duration in those patients that do not 
respond to existing therapies compared to those that do respond.  Combining these assumptions, we then 
calculated the percentage reduction in the total social burden of illness for the new antibacterial (see 
Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 below). 
Step 6 – Calculate Social EPV at the Model Reference Point (i.e., Start of Pre-clinical Phase).  
The value computed in Step 5 represents the social NPV at the point of product launch (i.e., the social 
value that corresponds to the uppermost end node on the decision tree depicted in Figure 2).  To be able to 
compare private ENPV to social EPV, we rolled back the social NPV using the respective success/failure 
probabilities for each decision tree branch all the way back to the model reference point. 
3.6 ANTIBACTERIAL DRUG SOCIAL EPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Table 15 presents the point estimates for the social EPV model parameters and assumptions.  The 
following sections discuss the basis for these estimates in further detail. 
3.6.1 Real Annual Social Rate of Discount 
In accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines for economic 
analysis, we use a real social discount rate of 3 percent in the analysis.  The social discount rate is 
assumed to have a triangular probability distribution with a lower bound of 1 percent and an upper bound 
of 7 percent in the sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 15: Social EPV Model Parameters and Assumptions (Point Estimates) 
Model Parameter/Assumption ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP 
Real Annual Social Rate of Discount 3% 
% of Patients Not Responding to Existing Drugs 20% 
% Increase in Duration in Patients Not Responding to Existing Drugs 50% 
Loss in Quality of Life, Acute  0.11 0.36 0.15 0.5 0.27 0.17 
Duration (days)  10 6 4 10 4 8.5 
Loss in Quality of Life, Convalescence  0.04 0.36 0.1 0.15 N/A N/A 
Duration (days)  20 18 5 12 N/A N/A 
Lost QALYs per illness  0.0049 0.0239 0.0038 0.0023 0.0030 0.0040 
Total Number of Cases per Year (unadjusted for population growth) 13,200,000 726,000 1,170,000 72,000 1,083,000 272,600 
Mortality Parameters       
     Deaths  0 1,923 51,683 14,554 36,900 81,779 
          Lost QALYs for Patients that Die  0 26,167 572,741 243,987 319,913 1,848,212 
          VSL per Patient  N/A $5,623,708 $5,301,924 $5,585,504 $4,953,688 $4,770,000 
Morbidity Parameters       
     Number of Patients that Survive  13,200,000 724,397 1,118,000 57,489 1,045,986 190,818 
          Lost QALYs for Patients that Survive  65,248 17,336 4,295 1,632 2,432 756 
          WTP (VSLY*Lost QALYs) per patient  $1,124 $8,749 $1,113 $12,717 $758 $1,149 
N/A = Not applicable 
QALY = Quality-adjusted-life-year 
VSL = Value of a statistical life 
VSLY = Value of a statistical life year 
WTP = Willingness-to-pay 
The figures in the table are rounded for presentation purposes. 
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3.6.2 Percentage of Patients not Responding to Existing Commonly Used Antibacterial 
Drugs 
The percentage of patients that do not respond to existing commonly used antibacterials is 
difficult to estimate on a nationwide as well as on an indication basis.  Antimicrobial resistance varies 
widely by hospital and geographic region, depending on local resistance patterns and standard prescribing 
practices.  
Published estimates of indication-specific antimicrobial resistance are scarce.  Evans, et al. (2007) 
find that out of 604 surgical admissions treated for at least one Gram-negative rod (GNR) infection in a 
university hospital surgical intensive care unit and ward, 137 (23 percent) were due to infections with 
GNR resistant to at least one major class of antibacterial drugs (rGNR).  In a later study, Roberts, et al. 
(2009) report that in a sample of 1,391 patients in a Chicago area hospital, 188 (13.5 percent) had 
antibacterial drug-resistant infections.11  According to a 2009 report by the European Center for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMEA), resistance to antibacterial 
drugs is high among Gram-positive and Gram-negative bacteria that cause serious infections in humans 
and reaches 25 percent or more in several EU Member States.12 
One expert interviewed for the study estimated that roughly a third of all hospital-acquired 
infections are resistant to standard antibacterial drugs but that resistance is increasing more slowly in the 
outpatient setting.  The expert further speculated that if approximately 30 percent of infections are 
resistant to antibacterial drugs in hospitals, the rate of resistance in the outpatient settings might range 
from 10 percent to 15 percent.  A large pharmaceutical executive noted that resistance to commonly used 
antibacterial drugs currently ranges from 20 percent to 25 percent according to internal research 
conducted by his company.   
Table 16 summarizes the antimicrobial resistance data available for the model estimate.  As can 
be observed from the table, reported estimates of antimicrobial resistance are highly varied.  Based on the 
collective body of evidence available, we use 20 percent as the average percentage of patients not 
responding to existing commonly used antibacterial drugs in the U.S., independent of type of indication.  
For sensitivity analysis, we assume that the parameter follows a uniform probability distribution with a 
lower limit of 10 percent and an upper limit of 25 percent. 
                                                     
11 In the study, an infection was defined as antibacterial resistant if the implicating organism(s) fell into one of four 
subgroups: (1) methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (2) vancomycin-resistant enterococci, (3) Escherichia 
coli resistant to fluoroquinolones or third-generation cephalosporins or Klebsiella species resistant to third-
generation cephalosporins (AREK), and (4) amikacin- or imipenem-resistant Enterobacter, Pseudomonas, or 
Acinetobacter species (AIR). 
 
12 In the study, the antibacterial resistant gram-positive bacteria included Staphylococcus aureus, Enterococcus spp. 
(e.g., Enterococcus faecium), and Streptococcus pneumoniae. The gram-negative bacteria included 
Enterobacteriaceae (Escherichia coli and Klebsiella spp.), and Non-fermentative Gram-negative bacteria 
(Pseudomonas aeruginosa). 
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3.6.3 Percentage Increase in Disease Duration for Patients Not Responding to Existing 
Commonly Used Antibacterial Drugs  
There are no publicly available estimates of how long each of the different types of illnesses last 
in patients who do not respond to existing commonly used antibacterial drugs.  Thus, for analysis 
purposes, we assume that those patients who do not respond to existing drugs have an average duration of 
illness 50 percent longer than those who do respond.  For sensitivity analysis purposes, we further assume 
that the parameter follows a uniform distribution with a lower bound of 25 percent and an upper bound of 
100 percent. 
In the analysis, we further assume that 1) all those not responding to existing commonly used 
antibacterial drugs respond to the new drug and 2) their duration of illness is reduced to the average of 
those responding to existing drugs.13  Combining these assumptions, we then calculate that a new 
antibacterial will reduce the total social burden of illness by about 9 percent.  This estimate is highly 
uncertain, as we do not know the actual improvement in patient response to a hypothetical new 
antibacterial drug.  It should also be noted that this does not imply that the new antibacterial drug will 
avert 9 percent of deaths attributable to the different types of indications studied here.  Given data 
limitations, our analysis cannot distinguish between avoided mortality and morbidity cases due to the new 
antibacterial drug.  We only are able to compute overall reductions in the total social burden of illness due 
to these new drugs in monetary terms. 
Table 16: Reported Estimates of Antimicrobial Resistance 
Source % of Patients Resistant to Commonly Used Antibacterial Drugs 
Evans, et al., 2007 [a] 23.0% 
Roberts, et al., 2009 [b] 13.5% 
ECDC/EMEA Joint Technical Report, 2009 [c] 
     Methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) 25.0% 
     Vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium 8.0% 
     Penicillin-resistant S. pneumonia 4.0% 
     Third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E. coli 9.0% 
     Third-generation cephalosporin-resistant K. pneumoniae 20.0% 
     Carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa 19.0% 
Expert 1 
     Inpatient 30.0% 
     Outpatient 10.0% - 15.0% 
Expert 2 20.0% - 25.0% 
[a] Based on a sample of 604 surgical admissions treated for at least one Gram-negative rod (GNR) infection [b] 
Based on a sample of 1,391 patients in a Chicago area hospital 
[c] Based on European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (EARSS) for EU Member States, Iceland 
and Norway for each year during the period 2002–2007 
 
                                                     
13 This is a simplifying assumption that likely leads to an overestimation of social benefits.  In reality, there will be 
time lost for the patient due to being on the wrong drug initially. 
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3.6.4 Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) 
To calculate VSL, we first took the value of a statistical life reported in 2000 dollars by age group 
from Aldy & Viscusi (2008).  Next, it was necessary to adjust the VSL values by age group to capture 
changes in real income as well as prices from 2000 to 2011.  Current data from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) show that the real personal income per capita was $28,888 in the year 2000 
and $32,635 in 2012 (both in 2005 dollars), yielding a growth rate of 13 percent over this span of time.  
Moreover, Hammitt & Robinson (2011) report that U.S. regulatory agencies generally assume that a 1.0 
percent change in real income over time will result in a 40 to 60 percent change in the VSL.  Using the 
midpoint of this range (50 percent), we inflated the reported VSL values by age group by 1.065 (= 1 + 
[0.5 × 0.13]) to account for changes in real income from 2000 to 2011.  To adjust the VSL values for 
price changes, we used the general consumer price index-based inflation calculator (available on the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website) that shows an average price increase of approximately 31 percent over 
the same time period.  We then calculated the age-specific VSLY and apply it to the estimated number of 
years of life lost for each condition. 
3.6.5 Morbidity 
3.6.5.1 ABOM 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
We obtained the number of cases per year from the literature on acute otitis media.  As ABOM is 
generally treated in the ambulatory care setting, we, like many other studies, considered it to be 
exclusively an outpatient disease and therefore used counts of outpatient visits to estimate the number of 
episodes per year (see, for example, Huang, et al., 2011).  The primary sources used by many researchers 
to obtain information on acute otitis media visits are the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey 
(NAMCS) and the National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NHAMCS), which are the only 
surveys of U.S. outpatient settings that collect drug prescribing information and allow for calculation of 
unbiased national estimates(Coco, Horst, & Gambler, 2009; Huang, et al., 2011). 
To obtain an estimate of the number of cases per year, we used the information contained in 
Appendix A of the paper by Huang, et al. (2011) on healthcare utilization and the cost of pneumococcal 
disease.  This study uses data from NAMCS/NHAMCS, to report by age group, the total number of 
outpatient visits for acute otitis media in which antibacterial drugs was prescribed.  Based on information 
gathered from expert panels and other papers, Huang, et al. (2011) also include estimates of how often 
typical resolution of the disease occurs (as opposed to delayed resolution), the number of follow-up 
visits/visits per episode, and the frequency of over-diagnosis.  Our first step in calculating the number of 
episodes per year was to determine the average number of outpatient visits per episode.  To do this, we 
multiplied the probabilities associated with typical and delayed resolution by the number of visits 
associated with each possibility and arrived at approximately 1.2 visits per episode.  Next, we adjusted the 
number of visits per year by subtracting the estimated proportion of visits that were over-diagnoses, and 
divided the resulting figures (broken down by age group) by the number of visits per episode, 1.2, to 
arrive at numbers of episodes per year by age group.  
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Across all age groups, we found there to be 12.6 million acute otitis media episodes for which 
antibacterial drugs were prescribed for the year 2004.  Our finding is  also  consistent  with  the  authors’  
statements that there were 1.5 million cases of acute otitis media due to pneumococcus, and 12 percent of 
acute otitis media cases are due to pneumococcus (1.5 million/0.12 = 12.5 million total cases of acute 
otitis media).  Using population estimates by age from the U.S. Census Bureau, we converted the total 
number of episodes by age group to rates and applied those rates to 2011 population figures to obtain a 
total number of cases for the year 2011, which we estimated to be 13.2 million.  Since there are no deaths 
associated with ABOM (see discussion below), this is equivalent to the total number of cases that do not 
result in death. 
QALYs Lost per Case 
In estimating lost QALYs due to ABOM, we considered one possibility: the patient is ill for a 
defined period of time and then returns to full health.  For more severe conditions, it would be appropriate 
to also consider the possibility of the patient dying; however, ABOM is not associated with significant 
mortality, and deaths are therefore unaddressed in the literature (see, for example, Huang, et al., 2011).  
We also consulted the Compressed Mortality File from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
and the National Center for Health Statistics and found that the number of deaths associated with various 
types  of  acute  otitis  media  were  either  zero  or  so  small  that  they  were  labeled  “unreliable.”   Therefore, we 
do not consider the possibility of death in our calculations of QALYs or other social cost estimations for 
ABOM. 
Assuming that all patients eventually recover from ABOM, we considered two possible 
scenarios: 1) the patient with ABOM is treated, and the initial treatment is successful, and 2) the patient 
with ABOM is treated, and the initial treatment is unsuccessful, delaying recovery.  In the Tufts database, 
we located a paper that provided numbers of days spent in each stage of the illness/treatment, as well as 
associated QALY weights (Coco, 2007).  This paper evaluated the patient condition over a standard of 30 
days.  Successful treatment resulted in the patient experiencing acute symptoms for 2.7 days, followed by 
27 days of recuperation.  Patients whose initial treatment was unsuccessful experienced the same acute 
symptoms for 2.7 days, followed by another 7 days when the patient would be even sicker; this leaves a 




According to the ABOM clinical practice guidelines, initial antibacterial drug therapy leads to 
symptomatic relief at 2 to 3 days in 91 percent of cases; therefore, we weighted success and failure 
possibilities at .91 and .09, respectively, to arrive at a weighted average of 0.00493 lost QALYs per 
ABOM episode (American Academy of Pediatrics and American Academy of Family Physicians, 
Subcommittee on Management of Acute Otitis Media, 2004). 
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Table 17: QALY Calculations for Acute Bacterial Otitis Media (ABOM) 
Scenario Days of ABOM Days of Treatment Success 
Days of Treatment 
Failure 
Initial Treatment Success (3) QALY weight: 0.79 2.7 days 
QALY weight: 0.96 
27 days N/A 
Initial Treatment Failure (4) QALY weight: 0.79 2.7 days 
QALY weight: 0.96 
20 days 
QALY weight: 0.72 
7 days 
Source: Coco, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Treatment Options for Acute Otitis Media, 2007. 
Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per ABOM case is 0.00493 and the total number of ABOM cases in the 
US is around 13.2 million, we computed the total annual QALYs lost due to ABOM morbidity to be 
around 65,000 (= 0.00493 × 13.2 million) in the US. 
Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die, which we assume to be all 
ABOM patients), we first calculated an average VSLY weighted by ABOM incidence by age group in 
2011.  This weighted average VSLY is roughly $228,000, which is then multiplied by the average lost 
QALYs per patient (0.00493) to arrive at $1,124 per patient which yields a total morbidity cost of $14.8 
billion. 
3.6.5.2 ABSSSI 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
The total number of cases per year was obtained from the literature on skin and skin structure 
infections.  Using data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample 
(HCUP NIS) for the 5-year period from 2000 to 2004, Edelsberg, et al. (2009) estimated the total number 
of hospital admissions for SSTIs to be 869,777 in 2004.  The authors also provided estimates broken 
down by type of skin infection, allowing us to exclude chronic ulcers and infections, gangrene, 
necrotizing fasciitis, decubitus ulcer infections, diabetic foot infections, and certain healthcare-associated 
infections (as specified in the FDA guidance for ABSSSIs) and arrive at an estimated 678,956 hospital 
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admissions for ABSSSIs, or approximately 231.9 per 100,000 population.  Applied to the 2011 U.S. 
population, this rate is equivalent to an estimated 726,321 inpatient ABSSSI cases for the year 2011.14  
We calculated the total number of patients hospitalized with ABSSSIs that do not die in a given 
year by subtracting those who die in that year from the total number of ABSSSI patients.  This number 
can then be subtracted from the estimated total number of hospital admissions for ABSSSI in 2011, 
726,321 (explained above), to get 724,397 surviving ABSSSI hospital patients. 
QALYs Lost per Case 
To calculate lost QALYs for patients who have an ABSSSI but recover, we first searched the 
Tufts database and found a QALY weight of 0.642 for cellulitis, abscess, and wound infection, three 
major types of ABSSSI (though this QALY weight was for hospital patients infected with MRSA and 
therefore might represent cases on the more serious end of the severity spectrum) (Lee, et al., 2010).  As 
with ABOM, we then adjusted the QALY weight by period of illness. 
The average length of inpatient stay for patients hospitalized for an SSTI is 6.1 days (Menzin, et 
al., 2010).  However, many skin infection patients are treated in both inpatient and outpatient settings, and 
length of hospital stay does not capture additional days spent sick or recovering outside the hospital.  The 
mean number of days of episode duration is 24.4 days, which includes time spent in both inpatient and 
outpatient treatment settings (Marton, et al., 2008).  Using 24.4 days as the illness period, we calculated 
the lost QALYs per patient to be 0.02393 as: 
(1-­0.642)×(24.4/365)=0.02393 
Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per ABSSSI case is 0.02393 and the total number of ABSSSI cases that 
do not result in death in the US is around 724,397, we computed the total annual QALYs lost due to 
ABSSSI morbidity to be 17,336 in the US. 
Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die), we first calculated an 
average VSLY weighted by ABSSSI incidence by age group (available from Edelsberg, et al., 2009).  
                                                     
14 The total number of ABSSSI cases—including patients who are treated in the outpatient setting only—is, 
however, far greater.  Hersh, et al. (2008) examined visits by patients with SSTIs to physician offices, hospital 
outpatient departments, and emergency departments using NAMCS and NHAMCS and found that the overall rate of 
visits for SSTIs was 48.1 visits per 1000 population in 2005, totaling 14.2 million visits.  As patients with skin 
infections are likely to visit these healthcare settings multiple times over the course of their SSTI episode, it is 
necessary to divide the total number of visits by the average number of visits per episode to arrive at the number of 
episodes per year.  According to Marton, et al. (2008), who analyzed skin and skin structure infections caused by 
Staphylococcus aureus using managed care claims data for the years 2002-2005, the mean number of physician 
visits per episode was 6.3.  Thus, 14.2 million outpatient visits divided by 6.3 visits per episode equals roughly 2.3 
million episodes per year in 2005, or 778.1 per 100,000 population.  Thus, the estimates presented herein constitute 
a lower bound. 
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This weighted average VSLY is roughly $365,500, which is then multiplied by the average lost QALYs 
per patient (0.02393) to arrive at $8,749 per patient. The total morbidity cost due to ABSSSI is then $6.3 
billion (= $8,749 × 724,397) per annum. 
3.6.5.3 CABP 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
We obtained the number of cases per year from the literature on community-acquired pneumonia 
and publicly available survey data.  Using the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey 
(NHANES) III, Niederman, et al. (1998) estimate the total number of CAP cases to be 5.6 million per 
year, or 2.3 percent of the U.S. population.  Of these 5.6 million patients, Niederman, et al. (1998) report 
that 1.135 million are treated as inpatients, and the remaining 4.5 million are treated as outpatients.  The 
National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) (2009), available from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) website, arrives at a similar total of 1.145 million discharges of patients treated for 
pneumonia, or a rate of 37.4 per 10,000 population.  Applied to the U.S. population in 2011, this rate 
yields an inpatient case count of approximately 1.17 million (National Hospital Discharge Survey, 2009), 
though these estimates are not limited to pneumonia cases with bacterial causative agents.  Subtracting the 
total number of deaths (51,683) from this estimate (see Section 3.6.6.3), yields a survivor count of 
approximately 1.12 million per year. 
QALYs Lost per Case 
We searched the Tufts database for pneumonia and found reasonable QALY weights to be 0.85 
for the period of hospitalization and 0.90 for the post-hospitalization period of convalescence (Pepper & 
Owens, 2002).  We then adjusted these weights by period of illness using the following equation: 
Lost  QALYs  per  Hospitalized  CABP  Patient   = (1− QALY  Weight  for  Hospitalization  ) ×
Length  of  Stay/365+ (1− QALY  Weight  for  Convalescense) × (Length  of  Convalescense/365)  
The average length of stay in the hospital for pneumonia patients is reported in Pepper & Owens 
(2002) to be 4 days.  However, length of hospital stay does not capture additional days spent sick or 
recovering outside the hospital.  Pepper & Owens (2002) also estimate that healthy young adults miss 
approximately 9 work days due to pneumonia that is treated in the hospital, which includes 4 days in the 
hospital and 5 days of convalescence.  Depending on what day a person gets sick, this may include one or 
two weekends, so we added 3 days to this convalescence period (1.5 weekends).  Thus, the lost QALYs 
per patient came out to be 0.00384 computed as: 
(1-­0.85)×(4/365)+(1-­0.90)×(8/365)=0.00384 
Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per CABP case is 0.00384 and the total number of CABP cases that do 
not result in death in the US is around 1.12 million, we computed the total annual QALYs lost due to 
CABP morbidity to be 4,295 in the US. 
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Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die), we took the VSLY for the 
age group containing the average age of a pneumonia inpatient (age 61, VSLY of $290,150), and 
multiplied it by the average lost QALYs per patient (0.00384) to arrive at a cost of $1,113 per patient. The 
total morbidity cost due to CABP was then computed at $1.2 billion (= $1,113 × 1,118,000) per annum. 
3.6.5.4 CIAI 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
Estimates of the number of cases of CIAIs each year in the U.S. were not readily available in the 
literature.  Therefore, we estimated incidence using the rate of 2.3 cases of secondary intra-abdominal 
infections (sIAI) per 10,000 person-years reported in a Netherlands-based study(Sturkenboom, et al., 
2005).  Using a database of pharmacy dispensing records from community pharmacies linked to 
hospitalization records, the authors identified potential cases of sIAI on the basis of a primary discharge 
diagnosis with one of the following International Classification of Diseases, ninth revision (ICD-9-CM) 
codes: 475, 540–543, 562, 567, 569, 574–577, 614.5, 997.4, 998.2, E8782, and E8783.  The authors then 
excluded  “all  potential  cases  that  did  not  receive  an  intra-abdominal surgical intervention to establish the 
diagnosis sIAI or antibacterial drug treatment  during  their  hospital  admission.”   Finally, a clinician and an 
epidemiologist reviewed the hospital discharge letters associated with the remaining cases to verify that 
they met the case definition used by the authors (cholecystitis with rupture; diverticular abscess; 
appendiceal perforation and periappendiceal abscess; acute gastric and duodenal perforation operated 
within 24 hours; perforation of intestines; traumatic perforation of the intestines; or intra-abdominal 
abscess).  To obtain an estimate of the number of U.S. cases per year, we applied the rate of 2.3 cases per 
10,000 person-years to the 2011 U.S. population, resulting in 72,043 cases.  Subtracting the total number 
of deaths (14,136) from this estimate (see Section 3.6.6.4), results in around 57,489 surviving CIAI 
hospital patients per year.  
QALYs Lost per Case 
We searched the Tufts database for utility weights related to intra-abdominal infections and found 
reasonable QALY weights to be 0.50 for the period of hospitalization and 0.85 for the post-hospitalization 
period of convalescence (Richards & Hammitt, 2002).  We then adjusted the utility weights by period of 
illness using the following equation: 
Lost  QALYs  per  Hospitalized  CIAI  Patient  
= (1− QALY  Weight  for  Hospitalization  ) × Length  of  Stay/365+ (1
−QALY  Weight  for  Convalescense) × (Length  of  Convalescense/365) 
The average length of stay in the hospital for complicated intra-abdominal infections is estimated 
in various pharmacoeconomic studies to be around 10 days(Cattan, et al., 2002; Sturkenboom, et al., 
2005; Walters, Solomkin, & Paladino, 1999).  To capture additional days spent sick or recovering outside 
the hospital, we used 21.8 days as an average length of the post-hospital convalescence period based on 
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the average length of convalescence after appendectomies (National Center for Health Statistics, 1963).  
Thus, the lost QALYs per patient were estimated at 0.002266 as: 
(1-­0.5)×(10/365)+(1-­0.85)×(21.8/365)=0.002266 
Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per CIAI case is 0.00266 and the total number of CIAI cases that do not 
result in death in the US is around 57,500, we computed the total annual QALYs lost due to CIAI 
morbidity to be 1,632 in the US. 
Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die), we took the VSLY for the 
age group containing the median age of a CIAI inpatient (age 53, VSLY of $561,250)(Sturkenboom, et 
al., 2005), and multiplied it by the average lost QALYs per patient (0.02266) to arrive at $12,717 per 
patient. The total morbidity cost due to CIAI was then computed at $731.1 million (= $12,717 × 57,489) 
per annum. 
3.6.5.5 CUTI 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
Assessing the incidence of CUTI is difficult because urinary tract infection is not a reportable 
disease in the United States(Foxman, 2002).  Total number of cases per year was obtained from the 
literature on urinary tract infections.  We estimated cases of community-acquired CUTI separately from 
cases of hospital-acquired (nosocomial) UTI.  
To arrive at a number of cases for community-acquired CUTI, we assumed that all inpatient 
hospitalizations where the primary diagnosis was urinary tract infection were cases of community-
acquired CUTI.  Griebling and Freedmen (2007) analyzed the 2000 National Inpatient Sample and 
estimated a total of 403,814 inpatient hospital stays for men, women and children with UTI as the primary 
diagnosis in 2000.  They provide rates of inpatient stays by age and gender breakdowns.  For comparison, 
we replicated this analysis with the 2009 NIS using the list of ICD-9 codes for urinary tract infection 
provided by the authors.  For 2009, we estimated a total of 543,140 inpatient hospital stays for men, 
women and children with UTI as the primary diagnosis.  When divided by the 2009 U.S. population, this 
is equivalent to a rate of 17.7 per 10,000 population.  The National Hospital Discharge Survey (NHDS) 
(2009), available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website, arrives at a similar 
total of 575,000 discharges of patients treated for urinary tract infection in 2009, or a rate of 18.8 per 
10,000 population.  For our calculations, we applied the 2000 rates of inpatient stays for men, women, 
and children to the U.S. population totals for those categories to arrive at a total an inpatient count of 
approximately 470,915 cases of community-acquired CUTI in 2011 (National Hospital Discharge Survey, 
2009). 
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According to a 2007 public health report that uses data from the National Nosocomial Infections 
Surveillance (NNIS) system (conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), 
supplemented by data from the National Hospital Discharge Survey and the American Hospital 
Association Survey, there were 561,667 cases of healthcare-associated urinary tract infection in 2002 
(Klevens, et al., 2007), which is equivalent to a rate of 195.4 per 100,000 population.  Applied to the 2011 
U.S. population, this rate results in an estimated 611,935 cases for the year 2011. 
We subtracted the estimated deaths from the estimated total number of CUTI cases in 2011 to get 
surviving CUTI hospital patients (448,311 and 597,675 for community-acquired and hospital-acquired, 
respectively, for a total of 1,045,986 CUTI cases). 
QALYs Lost per Case 
From the Tufts database, we found a QALY weight of 0.73 as a mean utility weight for bladder 
infections (Gold, Franks, McCoy, & Fryback, 1998).  This value is relatively consistent with a 0.2894 
disutility  (0.7106  utility)  for  “chronic  dysuria,  vaginitis and  other  symptoms”  from  a  different  cost-utility 
analysis of UTIs in ambulatory women, which also lists a disutility of 0.3732 for pyelonephritis (Barry, 
Ebell, & Hickner, 1997).  As was done for other indications, we adjusted this weight by period of illness.  
We calculated lost QALYs separately for community-acquired and hospital-acquired CUTI.  To 
calculate lost QALYs for community-acquired CUTIs, we used an average inpatient length of stay of 4 
days.  This number represents a weighted average length of stay for adults 18 to 64 years of age, who 
represent the bulk of the working population.  Although there may be some outpatient recovery time 
following hospitalization for patients who have suffered complicated urinary tract infections, that 
information is not readily accessible in the literature, so outpatient recovery time is not included in these 
estimates.  Thus, the lost QALYs per patient for community-acquired CUTI were estimated as: 
(1-­0.73)×(4/365)=0.00296 
As nosocomial CUTIs occur, by definition, in patients who are already hospitalized for other 
conditions, it is necessary to differentiate the length of time by which the episode of hospital-acquired 
CUTI  extends  the  patient’s  stay  from  the  entire  length of stay due to all conditions from which the patient 
suffers.  According to the literature, nosocomial UTI lengthens the period of hospitalization by 1 to 4 days 
(Lai & Fontecchio, 2002), so we used the midpoint of that range (2.5 days) for the purposes of our 
calculations.  Again, although there may be some outpatient recovery time following hospitalization for 
patients who have suffered from nosocomial CUTI, that information is not readily accessible in the 
literature, perhaps because it is so difficult to distinguish between recovery time for CUTI and recovery 
time  for  the  patient’s  underlying  illness(es).   Therefore, we do not include any outpatient recovery time in 
our estimates.  Using 2 days as the illness period, we calculated the lost QALYs per patient to be 0.00185 
as: 
(1-­0.73)×(2/365)=0.00185 
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Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per community-acquired CUTI case is 0.00296 and the total number of 
community-acquired CUTI cases that do not result in death in the US is around 448,000, we computed the 
total annual QALYs lost due to community-acquired CUTI morbidity to be 1,327 in the US. Similarly, 
the total annual QALYs lost due to hospital-acquired CUTI was computed as 1,106 (= 0.00185 × 
597,675) per year. This yielded a total of 2,432 QALYs lost due to CUTI overall per annum. 
Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die) we first calculated a 
weighted average WTP to avoid CUTI, which is equal to the VSLY weighted by CUTI incidence by age 
group in 2011.  To approximate the age distribution of CUTI incidence, we calculated the age distribution 
from 2000 HCUP data on inpatient stays with a primary diagnosis of UTI (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Diabetes and 
Digestive and Kidney Diseases, 2007).  The resulting weighted average VSLY is roughly $325,000 which 
is then multiplied by the average lost QALYs per patient (0.00296 and 0.00185 for community-acquired 
and hospital-acquired, respectively) to arrive at $961 per community-acquired CUTI patient and $601 per 
hospital-acquired CUTI patient, for a weighted average of $758 per patient for a CUTI case. The total 
morbidity cost due to CUTI was then computed at $792.9 million (= $758 × 1,045,986) per annum.  
3.6.5.6 HABP/VABP 
Total Number of Cases that do not Result in Death 
We obtained the number of cases per year from the literature on HABP/VABP. HABP is not a 
reportable illness, and diagnosis may be complicated due to overlap with other respiratory tract infections, 
especially for mechanically ventilated patients; therefore, determining incidence for HABP and VABP is 
difficult (American Thoracic Society; Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2005).  However, many 
sources cite available data suggesting that these infections occur at a rate of 5 to 10 cases per 1,000 
hospital admissions (American Thoracic Society; Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2005; 
McEachern & Campbell, 1998), or roughly 300,000 cases per year, as McEachern & Campbell (1998) 
report.  To get a more up-to-date estimate, we applied this rate to the 36.1 million inpatient discharges in 
2009 (from the National Hospital Discharge Survey), which yields a range of 180,500 to 361,000 
HABP/VABP cases per year, with the midpoint of the range equal to 270,750.  
According to a 2007 public health report (the same one used to estimate the number of hospital-
acquired CUTI cases), there were 250,205 cases of healthcare-associated pneumonia in 2002 (Klevens, et 
al., 2007), which is equivalent to a rate of 87.0 per 100,000 population.  Applied to the 2011 U.S. 
population, this rate results in an estimated 272,598 cases for the year 2011.  Though the 2007 report is 
not specific with regard to the types of infections that are included, the estimate of 272,598 cases per year 
is very close to the midpoint of the range calculated above (270,750).  It is also similar to the 300,000 
figure reported by McEachern & Campbell (1998).  Therefore, we determined that 272,598 was a 
reasonable point estimate of HABP/VABP cases in 2011.  Subtracting the total number of deaths (81,779) 
from this estimate (see Section 3.6.6.6), results in 190,818 surviving HABP/VABP hospital patients.  
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QALYs Lost per Case 
From the Tufts database, we found a QALY weight of 0.83 for VABP (Shorr, Susla, & Kollef, 
2004), which we then adjusted by period of illness. 
As HABP/VABP occur, by definition, in patients who are already hospitalized for other 
conditions, it is necessary to determine the length of time by which the episode of HABP or VABP 
extends  the  patient’s  stay  (as  opposed  to  the  entire  length  of  stay  due  to  all  conditions  from  which  the  
patient suffers).  According to the literature, HABP/VABP lengthens the period of hospitalization by 7 to 
10 days (McEachern & Campbell, 1998; Sampathkumar, 2009), so we use the midpoint of this range for 
the purposes of our calculations (8.5 days).  Though there may be some outpatient recovery time 
following hospitalization for patients who have suffered from HABP/VABP, that information is not 
readily accessible in the literature, perhaps because it is so difficult to distinguish between recovery time 
for  HABP/VABP  and  recovery  time  for  the  patient’s  underlying  illness(es).   Therefore, we do not include 
any outpatient recovery time in our estimates. Using 8.5 days as the illness period, we calculated lost 
QALYs as: 
(1-­0.83)×(8.5/365)=0.00396 
Total QALYs Lost due to Morbidity 
Given that lost QALYs per HABP/VABP case is 0.00396 and the total number of HABP/VABP 
cases that do not result in death in the US is around 191,000, we computed the total annual QALYs lost 
due to HABP/VABP morbidity to be 756 in the US. 
Morbidity Cost 
To calculate VSLY-based illness costs (for patients who do not die), we first selected an 
appropriate VSLY based on average patient age, as we do not have a breakdown of incidence by age 
group from the literature or other sources (as discussed above).  The VSLY for people aged 55 to 62 is 
$290,150, which is then multiplied by the average lost QALYs per patient (0.00396) to arrive at $1,149 
per patient. The total morbidity cost due to HABP/VABP was then computed at $219.2 million (= $1,149 
× 190,818) per annum. 
3.6.6 Mortality 
3.6.6.1 ABOM 
As discussed previously, we assumed the annual number of deaths due to ABOM to be zero.  
Therefore, the VSL-based mortality costs were assumed to be null. 
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3.6.6.2 ABSSSI 
Total Number of Cases that Result in Death 
We estimated the number of deaths attributable to ABSSSI to be 1,868 in 2008, or 0.61 per 
100,000 population.  Applying this rate to 2011 population estimates yields a total of 1,923 deaths 
attributed to ABSSSI in 2011. 
QALYs Lost 
To calculate lost QALYs for patients who die from skin infections, we used the Compressed 
Mortality File.  Using the mortality rate and age breakdowns for 2008 from the Compressed Mortality 
File, we estimated the total number of deaths by age group for the year 2011.  Life expectancies by age 
were available from the National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR).  To illustrate the calculation, there were 
an estimated 497 deaths caused by an ABSSSI among Americans aged 75-84 in 2011.  The life 
expectancy for an 80-year-old is 8.8 years; thus, each person who died from an ABSSSI at that age was 
assumed to have lost 8.8 years of life.  After matching the Compressed Mortality File age cohorts to an 
appropriate age in the NVSR data (usually the age in the middle of the cohort), we calculated total 
QALYs lost by the 75-84 age cohort as 4,374 (8.8 × 483).  Summing lost QALYs across all ages yielded 
a total of 26,167 QALYs lost due to ABSSSI deaths in 2011. 
Mortality Cost 
To calculate VSL-based mortality costs, we multiplied the number of deaths in each age group by 
the VSL for those age groups.  For ABSSSI, this resulted in $10.8 billion in mortality costs.  The average 
per-patient VSL, weighted by the number of deaths by age, is $5.62 million. 
3.6.6.3 CABP 
Total Number of Cases that Result in Death 
According to mortality data obtained from the NVSR, there were 50,774 deaths attributed to 
pneumonia in 2009; this is equal to a mortality rate of 16.5 per 100,000 population, which is equivalent to 
51,683 deaths in 2011 (U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, 2010). 
QALYs Lost 
Similar to ABSSSI, we used the Compressed Mortality File and data on life expectancies by age 
available from the National Vital Statistics Report (NVSR).  The 2009 deaths were broken down by age 
group in the NVSR, and we applied the same proportion of deaths by age group to the expected number 
of deaths in 2011.  To illustrate the calculation, there were estimated to be 13,971 deaths caused by 
pneumonia among Americans aged 75-84 in 2011.  The life expectancy for an 80-year-old is 8.8 years; 
therefore, total QALYs lost by the 75-84 age cohort is 122,945 (8.8 × 13,971).  Summing lost QALYs 
across all ages yielded a total of 572,741 QALYs lost due to CABP deaths in 2011. 
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Mortality Cost 
To calculate VSL-based mortality costs, we multiplied the number of deaths in each age group by 
the VSL for those age groups.  For CABP, this resulted in $274 billion in mortality costs.  The average 
per-patient VSL, weighted by the number of deaths by age, is $5.3 million.  
3.6.6.4 CIAI 
Total Number of Cases that Result in Death 
Using the Compressed Mortality File, we estimated the number of deaths attributable to CIAI to 
be 14,136 in 2008, or 4.65 per 100,000 population.  Applying this rate to 2011 population estimates yields 
a total of 14,554 deaths attributed to CIAI in 2011.  
QALYs Lost 
Using data available in the Compressed Mortality File and NSVR, we estimated the total number 
of deaths by age group for the year 2011.  To illustrate the calculation, there were an estimated 3,982 
deaths caused by a CIAI among Americans aged 75-84 in 2011.  The life expectancy for an 80 year old is 
8.8 years; therefore, total QALYs lost by the 75-84 age cohort is 35,042 (8.8 × 3,982).  Summing lost 
QALYs across all ages yielded a total of 243,987 QALYs lost due to CIAI deaths in 2011. 
Mortality Cost 
To calculate VSL-based mortality costs, we multiplied the number of deaths in each age group by 
the VSL for that age group.  For CIAI, this resulted in $31.6 billion in mortality costs.  The average per-
patient VSL, weighted by the number of deaths by age, is $5.59 million.  
3.6.6.5 CUTI 
Total Number of Cases that Result in Death 
For CUTI, estimates of both mortality and potential long-term morbidity are problematic because 
they are confounded by the morbidity/mortality of underlying disease and/or injury.  Our best source for 
mortality associated with community-acquired CUTI estimated an overall mortality rate of 13.7 percent, 
but  then  concluded  that  “only 15 [of 43] deaths were attributed directly to bacteremic urinary tract 
infection according to the criteria used in this study.  Of these 15 deaths, 13 occurred among patients on 
medical services, all but 1 of whom had alcoholic liver disease, malignancy and/or chronic neurologic 
disease”(Bryan & Reynolds, 1984).  For our calculations, we used a mortality rate of 4.8 percent (15 
deaths out of 313 cases), although even this adjusted rate might be high.  
In the public health report cited above in the calculation of projected healthcare-associated cases, 
Klevens et al. (2007) estimate that there were 13,088 deaths associated with healthcare-associated urinary 
tract infections in 2002, which is equivalent to a rate of 4.55 deaths per 100,000 population.  In that study, 
the percentage of patients with a healthcare-associated UTI whose death was determined to be caused by 
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or associated with the UTI from NNIS data was used to estimate the number of deaths.  Applied to the 
2011 U.S. population, this rate produces 14,259 deaths due to healthcare-associated pneumonia in 2011.  
Though the 2007 report is not specific with regard to the types of infections that are included (for 
instance, it may not be strictly limited to complicated UTIs), we used these figures in the absence of better 
data. 
QALYs Lost 
As was done for the other indications, we relied on data from the Compressed Mortality File 
(from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, available online 
from CDC WONDER) to approximate a breakdown of deaths by age.  Specifically, we utilized a 2008 
age  distribution  of  deaths  for  individuals  where  the  listed  cause  of  death  was  “Urinary  tract  infection,  site  
not  specified.”   This distribution is highly skewed; 92 percent of deaths due to UTIs are among 
individuals 65 years of age or older.  We used this distribution to estimate the number of deaths by age 
category for 2011.  To calculate lost QALYs, we multiplied the number of deaths due to CUTI 
(redistributed by age group by the breakdowns in the Compressed Mortality File) in each age category by 
the average years of life remaining for that age group.  Life expectancies by age were available from the 
NVSR.  Multiplying the number of deaths by these average life expectancies yields a total of 196,165 
QALYs lost due to community-acquired CUTI deaths and 123,748 QALYs lost due to hospital-acquired 
UTI in 2011 for an overall total of 319,913 QALYs lost.  
Mortality Cost 
To calculate VSL-based mortality costs, we multiplied the number of deaths in each age group by 
the VSL for those age groups.  For CUTI, this results in mortality costs of $112 billion and $71 billion for 
community-acquired and hospital-acquired CUTI, respectively, for an overall total of $183 billion.  The 
average per-patient VSL, weighted by the number of deaths by age, is $4.95 million. 
3.6.6.6 HABP/VABP 
Total Number of Cases that Result in Death 
Due to the nature of HABP/VABP, estimation of mortality was quite difficult.  As mentioned 
above, incidence estimates are relatively unrefined because HABP is not a reportable illness, and accurate 
diagnosis can be complicated.  Estimating mortality involves even greater uncertainty due to the fact that 
HABP occurs in patients who are already hospitalized for other serious conditions, making it difficult to 
determine whether deaths are due to the underlying illness or HABP/VABP.  Accordingly, the mortality 
rates seen in the literature on HABP/VABP vary widely.  As summarized in the 2005 American Thoracic 
Society/Infectious Diseases Society of America guidelines on hospital-acquired, ventilator-associated, 
and health care-associated  pneumonia,  “[t]he  crude  mortality  rate  for  HAP  may  be  as  high  as  30  to  70  
percent, but many of these critically ill patients with HAP die of their underlying disease rather than 
pneumonia.  The  mortality  related  to  HAP  (or  ‘attributable  mortality’)  has  been  estimated  to  be  between  
33 and 50 percent in several case-matching  studies  of  VAP.” 
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In our review of the literature, we saw mortality rates ranging from about 14 percent (Klevens, et 
al., 2007) to 50 percent (Warren, et al., 2003) to 50 percent and have therefore selected 30 percent as a 
reasonable middle point among the varying estimates and the low end of the mortality rates reported by 
the American Thoracic Society/Infectious Diseases Society of America guidelines.  Multiplying 30 
percent by our estimated number of HABP/VABP cases in 2011, 272,598, results in an estimated 81,779 
deaths in 2011. 
QALYs Lost 
Due to the  difficulties  associated  with  measuring  mortality  and  HABP’s  status  as  a  non-reportable 
illness, we were unable to find a breakdown of deaths by age group.  Therefore, to calculate years of life 
lost, we multiplied the number of deaths due to HABP/VABP by average years of life remaining for the 
age group including the average age of HABP/VABP patients.  We estimated average age by taking the 
midpoint of the average patient ages reported in two studies, 61.7(Rello, et al., 2002) and 58.3(Kollef, et 
al., 2006), to get 60.  Life expectancies by age are available from the NVSR.  For a 60-year-old, there are 
estimated to be 22.6 years of life remaining; thus, each person who died from HABP/VABP is assumed to 
have lost 22.6 years of life.  Multiplying the number of deaths (81,779) by this average life expectancy 
yields a total of 1,848,212 QALYs lost, due to HABP/VABP deaths in 2011. 
Mortality Cost 
To calculate VSL-based mortality costs, we multiplied the number of deaths in each age group by 
the VSL for those age groups; however, as mentioned above, the literature and available data resources 
did not provide a breakdown of deaths by age group for HABP/VABP.  Therefore, it was necessary to use 
the VSL for a representative patient (based on average age, which is 60), and multiply that by the annual 
number of deaths.  The VSL for people aged 55 to 62 is $4.77 million. 
3.7 SOCIAL EPV ESTIMATES BY INDICATION 
Figure 6 presents the estimated social EPVs by indication for a new antibacterial drug.  
Comparison of the social EPV values to private ENPV shows that the social EPV is significantly higher 
than private ENPV for all of the indications.  Interestingly, HABP/VABP, the indication with the lowest 
private ENPV (-$4 million) has the highest estimated social EPV ($12.2 billion).  CABP has the second 
highest social EPV ($9.4 billion) followed by CUTI ($6.1 billion).  The indications yielding the lowest 
social EPVs are ABOM ($487 million) and ABSSSI ($584 million).   
Similar to what was done for the private ENPV analysis, we assess the sensitivity of our social 
EPV results to model parameters and assumptions utilized by conducting a Monte Carlo analysis in which 
the point estimates reported in Table 15 were replaced by distribution of values (the probability 
distributions used and the applicable functional parameters are discussed in those sections applicable to 
the model parameter above).  Table 18 and Figure 6 present the results of this sensitivity analysis.  In the 
figure, as before, the error bars correspond to the 90 percent confidence bounds.  As can be observed, 
there is wide variation in the estimated social EPV values across the different indications.  The primary 
drivers for the observed wide range of social EPV results are attributable to the following model 
parameters in order of importance: 
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ABOM ABSSSI CABP CIAI CUTI HABP/VABP
Social ENPV $487 $584 $9,375 $1,069 $6,065 $12,166
Figure 6: Sensitivity of Estimated Social ENPVs by Indication for a New Antibacterial Drug (in $ 
Million) - Error Bars Represent 90% Confidence Bounds 
 Percentage change in disease duration for patients that do not respond to commonly used 
antibacterial drugs, 
 Phase 1 clinical trial success probability,  
 Pre-clinical R&D success probability, and 
 Real annual social rate of discount. 
Table 18: Social EPV Sensitivity Results (Figures are in $ Million) 
Indication Social EPV Min Mean Max 
ABOM $48 $486.6 $5,363 
ABSSSI $58 $584.2 $6,133 
CABP $706 $9,375.3 $72,494 
CIAI $114 $1,069.2 $10,231 
CUTI $674 $6,064.6 $54,795 
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4 VACCINES 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
From a public health standpoint, development of vaccines that effectively prevent illness caused 
by infectious agents is an attractive alternative or complement to developing drugs that treat those 
diseases, as it may reduce the need for consumption of antibacterial drugs and thus slow the development 
of antibacterial drug resistance. Vaccines for highly contagious diseases such as smallpox, polio, and 
measles have been used for many years, essentially eradicating those diseases in the United States and 
many other parts of the world. Vaccines developed more recently include a pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine for children as well as a meningococcal vaccine.  This section summarizes the key demand- and 
supply-side challenges associated with the development of new vaccines. 
4.1.1 Demand-side Challenges 
It is traditionally argued that the existence and use of vaccines creates a positive externality, 
meaning that vaccination not only prevents the inoculated individuals from getting sick; it also reduces 
the likelihood that any non-vaccinated individuals around them will get sick.15  While this is a beneficial 
characteristic of vaccination, it also creates two unfortunate side effects.  First, individuals may have an 
incentive  to  “free  ride”;;  in  other  words,  they  may count on their neighbors getting vaccinated to decrease 
their chances of getting sick rather than getting vaccinated themselves.  Second, a private decision-maker 
considering whether or not to consume or produce a vaccine will likely only consider the private 
(personal) costs and benefits of vaccination rather than taking this broader social benefit into account.  As 
a result, society as a whole will tend to under-consume vaccines. 
At the individual consumer level, people have proven largely unwilling to pay for higher priced 
vaccines out-of-pocket.  This may be due in part to a failure among consumers to recognize the value of a 
vaccine in preventing periods of suffering and lost productivity due to infectious illness (Kaper, Rappuoli, 
& Buckley, 2005).  Instead of paying to avoid an uncertain event, people may prefer to take their chances 
and bear the costs of treatment if and when they become sick.  Additionally, many doctors and consumers 
believe, based on past experience with childhood vaccines, that vaccination should be cheap, which is not 
often the case with newer products (Kaper, Rappuoli, & Buckley, 2005).  Lack of insurance coverage for 
vaccination is also problematic; for example, those for whom vaccination is not covered by private 
insurance would have to pay over $240 for the recommended four doses of pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine,  a  sum  that  exceeds  many  people’s  willingness  to  pay  for  illness  avoidance  (Sloan, Berman, 
Rosenbaum, Chalk, & Griffin, 2004).  Insurance reimbursement has been key to the market success of the 
latest generation of higher-priced vaccines. 
Under requirements of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, insurers will pay for vaccines 
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).  Producers of newer 
vaccines may face demand-related challenges and manufacturers of vaccines are more likely to cease 
production if their vaccines are not recommended by ACIP.  In addition, sales potential for specialized 
                                                     
15 By contrast, antibiotic resistance is a negative externality; individual consumption of antibiotics contributes to the 
development  of  resistant  strains  and  reduces  the  drugs’  effectiveness  for  society  as  a  whole. 
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vaccines such as those for anthrax, cholera, rabies, and plague can be quite limited (Scherer, 2004).16  
For instance, production of the vaccine for Lyme disease was discontinued when the market proved to be 
significantly smaller than the manufacturer originally estimated (Kaper, Rappuoli, & Buckley, 2005).  For 
other important vaccines, the market is sizable (e.g., roughly $700 million in U.S. sales for influenza) 
(Scherer, 2004); however, the longer the period over which a vaccine is effective, the smaller the demand 
(Danzon, Pereira, & Tejwani, 2005).  Furthermore, in comparison to other product lines that vaccines may 
compete against within a company—particularly drugs taken daily by patients with chronic illnesses such 
as high cholesterol or high blood pressure—low profit margins and high financial risk often render 
vaccine development an unattractive option (Layton & Lenfestey, 2005). 
4.1.2 Supply-side Challenges 
There are certain key differences between the processes of developing and manufacturing a 
vaccine and producing a new drug that serve as additional barriers to vaccine development.  For one 
thing, vaccines are generally derived from living pathogenic organisms which are more complex in terms 
of their molecular structures and the processes needed to control and produce them than the components 
of other pharmaceutical products (Layton & Lenfestey, 2005; Scherer, 2004). 
Furthermore, unlike with drugs, vaccine trials and development of production facilities take place 
simultaneously, as production facilities must be up and running prior to licensure (Honeycutt, Robinson, 
& Layton, 2005).  This requirement has major implications on the start-up costs for manufacturing a 
vaccine, as the processes of building a plant, honing manufacturing techniques, and training staff can cost 
as much as $300 to $400 million (Murphy, 2002), depending on the production technology required. 
As one might expect given differences such as these in the processes and complexity involved in 
developing a vaccine versus a new drug, disparities between biopharmaceutical and pharmaceutical 
products have also been reported in development times, costs, and phase transition probabilities.  While 
biopharmaceutical products such as vaccines may have slightly higher transition probabilities for some 
clinical phases than drugs, DiMasi & Grabowski (2006) find that costs per clinical phase may be 
significantly higher for biopharmaceutical products, depending on how costs are measured and compared.  
With regard to phase length, a chart included in DiMasi & Grabowski (2006) (reproduced in Figure 7 
below) shows that total time to market is longer for vaccines, a finding reflected in the parameters chosen 
for our model (as discussed below). 
                                                     
16 It should be noted that the recent successful vaccine introductions, such as the HPV vaccine, could overturn this 
conventional wisdom from the previous 30 years.  
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Source: DiMasi & Grabowski, 2006 
 
4.2 VACCINE PRIVATE ENPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
For the purposes of modeling the decision-making process and expected returns for a vaccine 
producer, we chose to model a theoretical new vaccine effective in preventing acute bacterial otitis media 
(ABOM).  ABOM was chosen because otitis media is an infectious disease for which efforts to develop a 
preventive vaccine are already underway; therefore, we were able to find published studies including data 
specific to this indication that could be used in our modeling.17  The obtained results should be interpreted 
in the context of this indication and cannot be extended to other areas. 
Table 19 presents the point estimates for the private ENPV model parameters and assumptions for 
vaccines. The following sections discuss the basis for these estimates in further detail. 
4.2.1 Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 
The real opportunity cost of capital represents the rate of return (net of inflation) that the vaccine 
developer would otherwise be able to earn at the same risk level as the investment in the new vaccine that 
has been selected.  The cost of capital we use in the model is based on information gathered during 
interviews with industry experts.  While vaccines are biopharmaceutical products, they are often 
                                                     
17 See, e.g., O'Brien, et al., 2009. 
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developed and manufactured by divisions of big pharmaceutical companies.  Thus, even though the 
experts interviewed reported that biopharmaceutical companies use rates ranging from 18 to 24 percent, 
we selected the 11 percent rate deemed appropriate for pharmaceutical developers as was done for the 
analysis of antibacterial drugs in Section 3.2.1 above. 
Table 19: Private ENPV Model Parameters and Assumptions (Point Estimates) for Vaccines 
Parameter Point Estimate 
Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 11.0% 
Pre-clinical R&D Time (in Years) 4.3 
Pre-clinical R&D Cost $73,901,395 
Pre-clinical R&D Success Probability 57.0% 
Sample Preparation for Animal/Human Studies $2,676,066 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 1.6 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Cost $39,838,628 
Phase 1 Clinical Trial Success Probability 72.0% 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 2.4 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Cost $46,515,424 
Phase 2 Clinical Trial Success Probability 79.0% 
Process Research/Development/Design $26,760,658 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 2.7 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Cost $118,590,265 
Phase 3 Clinical Trial Success Probability 71.0% 
Plant Design $13,380,329 
FDA Biologics License Application (BLA) Review Time (in Years) 1.3 
BLA Submission to Launch Cost $1,958,800 
BLA Success Probability 96.0% 
Plant Build $508,485,294 
Total Time to Market (in Years) 12.48 
Total Cost of Development $1,413,891,197 
Time to Generic Entry upon FDA Approval (in Years) 12 
% Reduction in Revenues due to Generic Competition 0.0% 
Total Product Life (in Years) 20 
Average Expected Price per Dose $63 
Number of Doses 4 
Product Launch Success Probability 60% 
Because this parameter value heavily influences private ENPV outcomes, we assign a triangular 
probability distribution with a lower limit of nine percent, an upper limit of 24 percent, and a likely point 
estimate of 11 percent for sensitivity analysis purposes. 
4.2.2 Pre-Clinical, Clinical Phase, and BLA Submission Costs 
We estimated per-phase costs for vaccine development using out-of-pocket pre-clinical and 
clinical period costs per investigational biopharmaceutical compound from DiMasi & Grabowski (2006).  
These estimates were given in 2005 dollars; therefore, we inflated them using a consumer price index for 
medical care from BLS.  This resulted in cost totals of $73.9 million, $39.8 million, $46.5 million, and 
$118.6 million for the pre-clinical phase, Phase 1 trials, Phase 2 trials, and Phase 3 trials, respectively. 
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The reported new drug application fee for those drug or biologic product applications requiring 
clinical data is $1,958,800 for fiscal year 2013.  Thus, we use this figure as the BLA submission cost in 
the model as we did for antibacterial drug products.  
4.2.3 Pre-Clinical, Clinical, and BLA Submission Phase Durations 
As with drugs, private ENPV for vaccine development is dependent on the duration of each phase 
and the distribution of out-of-pocket costs throughout each phase.  To estimate the lengths of these 
phases, we consulted DiMasi & Grabowski (2006), in which phase lengths of 52.0, 19.5, 29.3, and 32.9 
months are reported for the pre-clinical phase, Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3, respectively.  The 
regulatory review period is estimated by the authors to last 16 months (for a total time-to-market of 12.5 
years).  These phase lengths, applicable to biopharmaceutical compounds, translate to point estimates 
with the following bounds (in years): 
 Pre-clinical: Lower bound of 3.5, upper bound of 5.2, point estimate of 4.3 years, 
 Phase 1: Lower bound of 1.3, upper bound of 2.0, point estimate of 1.6 years, 
 Phase 2: Lower bound of 2.0, upper bound of 2.9, point estimate of 2.4 years, 
 Phase 3: Lower bound of 2.2, upper bound of 3.3, point estimate of 2.7 years, and  
 Regulatory Review: Lower bound of 1.1, upper bound of 1.6, point estimate of 1.3 years. 
4.2.4 Pre-clinical, Clinical, BLA Submission Success Probabilities 
Success probabilities (phase transition probabilities) applicable to vaccines were found in Struck, 
1996.  These were used as likely point estimates in the model, bounded as follows:  
 Pre-clinical: Lower bound of 27.0 percent, upper bound of 77.0 percent, likely point estimate 
of 57.0 percent, 
 Phase 1: Lower bound of 52.0 percent, upper bound of 92.0 percent, likely point estimate of 
72.0 percent, 
 Phase 2: Lower bound of 59.0 percent, upper bound of 99.0 percent, likely point estimate of 
79.0 percent, 
 Phase 3: Lower bound of 51.0 percent, upper bound of 91.0 percent, likely point estimate of 
71.0 percent, and 
 BLA Approval: Lower bound of 76.0 percent, upper bound of 99.0 percent, likely point 
estimate of 96.0 percent. 
4.2.5 Costs of Supply Chain Activities 
Vaccine developers, like drug sponsors, need to undertake a variety of additional activities 
concurrently with clinical development, including sample preparation, process research, process 
development, process design, and plant design and construction.  These activities are discussed in greater 
detail in Section 4.2.5, and Table 9 in Section 4.2.5 presents the cost estimates for each of these supply 
FINAL APRIL 15, 2014 
  4-6 
chain activities as available from Blau et al. (2004).  We use the same figures for vaccines as were used 
for new drugs, with the exception of plant build costs.  For this parameter, we used a vaccine-specific cost 
estimate found in Murphy (2002) and inflated to 2012 dollars to arrive at a total of approximately $500 
million.  This is substantially higher than the plant build cost used for development of a new antibacterial 
drug and reflects the unique challenges of vaccine manufacturing.  As vaccines are complex products that 
are created from living organisms and are mainly given to healthy people (making any side effects highly 
undesirable), vaccine development involves processes and regulatory requirements that are different from 
those for drugs intended for use by sick people; therefore, construction of special facilities is a necessity 
in most cases (Murphy, 2002). 
4.2.6 Total Product Life 
As for drugs, we use 20 years to characterize the average life cycle of a new vaccine upon market 
approval (DiMasi, Grabowski, & Vernon, 2004).  Though the span of time over which a vaccine is used 
may extend beyond this 20-year period, expected revenues from sales in years beyond 20 contribute very 
little to private ENPV due to discounting, and the model allows the user to vary this parameter for what-if 
scenario analysis if needed. 
It should be noted that the threat of generic competition which we took into consideration for new 
drug products is virtually nonexistent for vaccines in the United States.  Barriers to generic entry include 
the lack of an abbreviated application process for biologics such as exists for generic drugs (thus generic 
entrants would have to undergo the same costly steps of demonstrating safety and efficacy as a vaccine 
originator would), small markets, and the proprietary nature of some vaccine strains.  However, vaccine 
products may still be superseded in the market by newer, more effective products (Danzon, Pereira, & 
Tejwani, 2005). 
4.2.7 Product Launch Success Probability 
According to Griffin (1997), only about 60 percent of new product launches end up being 
commercially successful.  As we did for antibacterial drugs, we use this as our basis for new vaccines.  
For sensitivity analysis, we use a triangular distribution for the product success probability with a lower 
bound of 40 percent and an upper bound of 80 percent. 
4.2.8 Average Expected Price per Dose and Number of Doses 
Before calculating the expected revenues that would be earned by the manufacturer of a new 
ABOM vaccine, we first estimated the total number of doses that would be required per patient and the 
average expected price per dose.  These were then multiplied by the projected portion of the population 
that would use the vaccine over the next 20 years (total product life).  Consistent with the assumptions 
made  in  O’Brien,  et  al.  (2009),  in  which  the  authors  estimated  the  projected  benefits  and  cost-
effectiveness of new vaccines for otitis media that were being developed, we chose to assume that its 
theoretical new vaccine would require four doses.  To estimate an average price per dose, we consulted 
the most recent Vaccine Price List, available on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
website, and took the average of the minimum and maximum prices reported in the pediatric vaccine list 
($9 and $116, respectively) to get an estimated price of $63. 
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4.3 PRIVATE ENPV RESULTS 
We found that the private ENPV for a new ABOM vaccine is $515.1 million. This is positive, 
indicating that the expected returns from developing such a vaccine are greater than the development 
costs. It is also worth noting that the private ENPV for developing a new ABOM vaccine are much higher 
than the private ENPV for developing a new antibacterial drug for ABOM, which was shown in Section 
3.3 to be -$3.0 million.  Because the private ENPV estimated ($515.1 million) exceeds the threshold value 
of $100 million, we did not conduct a threshold analysis of different types of incentives for the ABOM 
vaccine. It should be noted that the private ENPV could have been lower than $100 million had we 
selected another indication to model, indicating the desirability of market incentives. Therefore, the 
results presented here are limited to vaccines for ABOM and should not be viewed as representative of all 
types of vaccines. 
Similar to the antibacterial drug analysis, we assessed the sensitivity of our results to our model 
parameters and assumptions by conducting a Monte Carlo analysis in each the point estimates were 
replaced by distribution of values (the probability distributions used and the applicable functional 
parameters are discussed in those sections applicable to the model parameter above). This results in a 
large private ENPV range of -$63.7 million to $1.479 billion. The primary drivers for the observed wide 
range of results are attributable to the following model parameters in order of importance: 
 Average expected price per dose, 
 Real opportunity cost of capital, 
 Pre-clinical R&D success probability, 
 Clinical phase success probabilities, and 
 Total time to market. 
As described above with relation to antibacterial drugs, we did not model changes in 
reimbursement as a variable parameter. 
4.4 SOCIAL EPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The framework we used to assess social benefits for a new ABOM vaccine is the same as that 
used for antibacterial drugs and described earlier in this report. We use the same values for the real annual 
social discount rate, VSL, and VSLY as in the antibacterial drugs model.  Table 20 presents the point 
estimates for the social EPV model parameters and assumptions.  The following sections discuss the basis 
for these estimates in further detail. 
4.4.1 Expected Effectiveness of Vaccine 
The expected effectiveness of the vaccine is used to determine how many cases of ABOM might 
be avoided as a result of the new vaccine being available, a component of social benefit.  To estimate the 
effectiveness of a new ABOM vaccine, we used the midpoint of the range of 1 to 50 percent (25.5 
percent)  given  by  O’Brien,  et  al.  (2009),  which  is  specific  to  vaccines  for  otitis  media.   We then multiply 
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25.5 percent by the number of children  aged  0  to  5  expected  to  receive  the  vaccination  over  the  product’s  
total life to estimate the number of ABOM cases which would be prevented by the vaccine.  This yields a 
range of approximately 700,000 cases prevented in the first year the vaccine is used to up to 2.7 million 
cases in subsequent years, taking into account the anticipated growth rate in this segment of the 
population as well as changes in the predicted vaccine adoption rate over this time period.  For reference, 
we estimate that the baseline case counts over this time period range from 6.7 million to 8.3 million. 
Table 20: Social EPV Model Parameters and Assumptions for a New ABOM Vaccine 
Parameter Point Estimate 
Real Annual Social Rate of Discount 3% 
Expected Effectiveness of Vaccine 25.5% 
2000 Real Personal Income Per Capita in 2005 $ $28,888 
2012 Real Personal Income Per Capita in 2005 $ $32,635 
Real GDP Growth, 2000 – 2011 13.0% 
Income Elasticity of VSL 50.0% 
VSLY Inflator 1.065 
VSL in 2000 $ for 0 - <5 yr olds $3,740,000 
VSL in 2000 $ Adjusted for Income for 0 - <5-Yr Olds $3,982,554 
VSL in 2012 $ Adjusted for Income for 0 - <5-Yr Olds $5,309,933 
Life Expectancy for an Average 3-Year Old 75 
VSLY in 2012 $ Adjusted for Income for 0 - <5-Yr Olds $178,775 
Average Number of Lost QALYs for Patients with ABOM 0.0049266 
WTP (VSLY*Lost QALYs) Per Patient $881 
4.4.2 Average Number of Lost QALYs for Patients with ABOM 
The method by which the average number of lost QALYs due to ABOM was calculated is 
described in detail in Section 3.6.5.1. 
4.4.3 Per-Patient Willingness to Pay 
Willingness to pay to avoid illness is calculated as the product of VSLY ($178,775) and the 
number of lost QALYs per patient (0.00493), which equals $881. 
4.5 SOCIAL EPV RESULTS 
We estimated the social EPV for a new ABOM vaccine to be $2.281 billion. Comparison of the 
social EPV value to private ENPV shows that the social EPV is substantially higher than the private 
ENPV by $2.213 billion. When a Monte Carlo analysis was conducted to gauge the sensitivity of our 
results to changes in model parameters and assumptions, we find that the social EPV could potentially 
range from $148.0 million to $7.742 billion.  The primary drivers for the observed wide range of social 
EPV results include 1) expected effectiveness of vaccine, 2) real annual social rate of discount, 3) pre-
clinical R&D success probability, and 4) clinical phase success probabilities. 
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5 RAPID POINT-OF-CARE (POC) DIAGNOSTICS 
There is a need for specific and inexpensive rapid point of care (POC) diagnostic tests that can be 
used for clinical management of infectious diseases.  Diagnostics are important as they allow tailoring 
treatment with antibacterial drugs, reducing unnecessary antibacterial drug use and thereby delaying the 
development of antibacterial resistance.  However, the tools need to be readily available at point-of-care 
and cost-effective, such as the rapid strep test.  Additionally, the tools that work best are technologies that 
can be used across the entire patient population.  Given the potential complexity of some of these tests, 
there also needs to an educational component so healthcare practitioners know how to use the tests and be 
able to interpret the test results.  
At present, it takes about 3 days (and sometimes a week) to identify organisms.  If such tests 
could be done more expeditiously, physicians can institute a narrower antibacterial drug therapy relieving 
the pressure in terms of selecting resistant organisms (by using antibacterial drugs that are ineffective 
against the organism, one starts selecting out mutants that are more resistant and become more resistant 
over time). 
The different types of rapid POC diagnostic tools for bacterial diseases currently available in the 
market may be imperfect; they may be costly, not particularly fast, or otherwise limited in scope.  Some 
of these diagnostics include:  
 PNA FISH test – The test is done on a positive blood culture and reportedly returns results in 
24-36 hours.  Additionally, laboratories reportedly have found it difficult to incorporate this 
test into their workflow. 
 BioFire Diagnostics FilmArray® System – This molecular assay can identify 17 viruses and 
4 bacteria within an hour, but currently costs around $300 (although price will likely go down 
in the future). 
 Procalcitonin (PCT) – This is a test used in some hospitals to diagnose sepsis or to rule it out.  
However, because the test does not reveal whether the infection is multi-drug resistant, it is 
not widely adopted. 
One of the challenges that relate to the use of rapid POC diagnostics is the existence of a range of 
organisms residing on the body without causing infections, which makes it difficult to pinpoint which 
bacteria are actually causing the infection.  By adjusting the cut-off result in molecular assays to 
distinguish colonized from organisms actually causing the signs and symptoms of infection, this issue has 
been partially mitigated.  However, this factor may impact the acceptance of rapid POC diagnostics by 
healthcare providers. 
5.1 RAPID POC DIAGNOSTIC PRIVATE ENPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
For the purposes of modeling the decision-making process and expected returns for a rapid point-
of-care diagnostic producer, we selected a new rapid point-of-care diagnostic designed to identify 
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methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) that can cause serious infections, such as skin or 
wound infections, pneumonia, or infections of the blood.  While community acquired MRSA is on the 
rise, in this analysis, we focused primarily on healthcare–associated MRSA infections, which occur in 
hospitals and nursing homes.  The selection of MRSA is based on the fact that there are 1) diagnostic tests 
on the market and under development for the infection and 2) published studies with MRSA-specific 
quantitative information that can be used in our modeling. 
Table 21 presents the point estimates for the private ENPV model parameters and assumptions for 
the rapid point-of-care diagnostics for bacterial infectious disease.  The following sections discuss the 
basis for these estimates in further detail. 
Table 21: Private ENPV Model Parameters and Assumptions for a Rapid POC Diagnostic for 
MRSA 
Parameter Point Estimate 
Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 11.0% 
R&D Time (in Years) 2.0 
R&D Cost $1,397,000 
R&D Success Probability 33% 
Clinical Trial Time (in Years) 2.0 
Clinical Trial Cost $2,000,000 
Clinical Trial Success Probability 80.0% 
FDA 510(k) Application Review Time (in Years) 0.4 
FDA 510(k) Application Review Cost $124,960 
FDA 510(k) Application Success Probability 96.0% 
Supply Chain Activity Costs $9,861,488 
Time to generic entry upon FDA Approval (in Years) 3 
% Reduction in Revenues due to Competition 50.0% 
Total Product Life (in Years) 20 
Average Expected Price per Test $76 
Product launch success probability 60% 
Expected Market Share at Peak-Year Sales 24% 
5.1.1 Real Opportunity Cost of Capital 
As previously discussed (see Sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.1), the real opportunity cost of capital 
represents the rate of return (net of inflation) that a developer would otherwise be able to earn at the same 
risk level as the investment in the new rapid POC diagnostic that has been selected.  Based on discussions 
with industry experts and published studies, we use an 11 percent cost of capital in the model.  Similar to 
the antibacterial and vaccine analyses, because this parameter value heavily influences private ENPV 
outcomes, we assign a triangular probability distribution with a lower limit of 9 percent, an upper limit of 
24 percent, and a likely point estimate of 11 percent for sensitivity analysis purposes.  
5.1.2 R&D Costs 
R&D costs for a new rapid POC diagnostic are variable based on whether the diagnostic would 
require the development of a new platform (i.e., instrumentation) along with the test.  Other factors also 
influence R&D costs, such as the existence of a predicate device.  Given that there currently are FDA-
approved MRSA tests in the market, we assume that the new rapid POC diagnostic for detecting MRSA 
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colonization will likely have a predicate device which will allow the manufacturer to pursue FDA 
clearance through the 510(k) route. 
While the precise sequence of the steps may vary from case to case, the R&D costs associated 
with bringing a device to market generally include: development of engineering drawings, definition of 
the final materials list, device bench testing, development of design controls as well as costs related to 
market research to establish that a clinical need and a market for a new device, or a new version of a 
device, exists.  Table 22 presents estimates for the different R&D cost components.  Based on Table 22, 
we estimate the total R&D cost for a rapid POC diagnostic for MRSA at $1.4 million.  For sensitivity 
analysis, we assume that the R&D costs follow a triangular distribution with a lower bound of $1.0 
million and an upper bound of $2.0 million, with a likely point estimate of $1.4 million. 
Table 22: R&D Costs for a New Rapid POC Diagnostic Requiring a 510(k) Approval 
R&D Component Cost ($) 
Exploratory research – engineering drawings, final material list, and bench testing $1,000,000 
Identification of Predicate Devices $15,000 
Development of Design Controls $200,000 
Development of SOPs $30,000 
Development of a Risk Management System $30,000 
Holding a pre-Submission Meeting with FDA $2,000 
Preparation of Indications for Use $20,000 
Validation of Device Sterility $75,000 
Investigational Device Exemption (IDE) Approval [a] $25,000 
Total $1,397,000 
Source: Eastern Research Group, Inc., 2012 
[a] This cost component may not be applicable to a POC diagnostic for MRSA. 
5.1.3 Clinical Research Costs 
Depending upon the characteristics of the diagnostic, manufacturers might be required to perform 
one or more clinical trials, to obtain data for a 510(k) and data to obtain a CLIA Waiver for POC use.  
While only a small fraction of 510(k) devices perform any clinical trials, most of the FDA-approved rapid 
diagnostics for bacterial diseases have conducted clinical trials in support of their 510(k) applications.  
Thus, we assume that the manufacturer of a new MRSA rapid POC diagnostic will need to conduct a 
pivotal clinical trial to demonstrate substantial equivalence to a predicate device.  Based on discussions 
with  industry  experts  and  ERG’s  research,  the  pivotal  trial  costs  could  range  from  a  low  of  $250,000  to  as  
high as $4.0 million for some diagnostics that require 3,000 – 4,000 patients and collection of multiple 
specimens and inclusion of symptomatic as well as asymptomatic patients.  Given the wide range, we use 
a point estimate of $2.0 million for conducting pivotal trials for a rapid POC diagnostic for MRSA.  It 
should be noted that the estimate may overstate the clinical research costs given information provided in 
some of the recent 510(k) submissions for a MRSA rapid POC diagnostic test (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2007).  Similar to the other parameters, we assume that the clinical research costs follow 
a triangular distribution with a lower bound of $250,000 and an upper bound of $4.0 million. 
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5.1.4 FDA 510(k) Submission Costs 
Upon completion of clinical research, the manufacturer of the new diagnostic needs to prepare the 
labeling for the product and submit it to FDA.  We estimate this effort at $20,000 for a new rapid POC 
diagnostic manufacturer.  Additionally, under the Medical Device User Fee Act (MDUFA), device 
sponsors must pay a fee for entering the FDA review process.  The 2013 FDA fee for 510(k) submissions 
is $4,960.  Lower fees apply for small businesses.  The costs for preparing this regulatory submission 
(i.e., 510(k) clearance package) could be highly variable depending on device characteristics.  We 
estimate  this  cost  at  $100,000  based  on  ERG’s  previous  research  (Eastern Research Group, Inc., 2012).  
Combined, the costs for submitting a 510(k) application to FDA with clinical data are estimated at 
$124,960. 
5.1.5 Phase Durations 
There are no published studies that provide estimates of time to market for rapid POC 
diagnostics.  Based on discussions with industry experts, the time it takes to bring a new rapid POC 
diagnostic to market could range from 2 to 3 years if the diagnostic does not require the development of a 
new platform to around 5 years if a new platform is necessary along with the test.  For the model, we 
assume that it takes 4 years to get to the point of submitting a 510(k) application to FDA, with 2 years 
spent on R&D and the remaining two years on clinical research.  Further, we estimate that it takes 143 
days (i.e., 0.39 year) for a complete review of the submitted application based on FDA data (U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, 2012). 
5.1.6 Phase Success Probabilities 
While unable to provide quantitative estimates of success probabilities, industry experts 
interviewed for the study indicated that by the time a device reaches the clinical stage, it has a very high 
chance of success in making it to market.  Experts also noted that most failures tend to occur at the early 
research and development phase.  Based on this input, we assume success probabilities of 33 percent, 80 
percent, and 96 percent for the R&D, clinical, and FDA application stages, respectively, in the analysis.  
We further assume that each of these parameters follows a triangular distribution with the following 
bounds: 
 R&D phase success probability: Lower bound of 25 percent, upper bound of 50 percent, 
likely point estimate of 33 percent, 
 Clinical phase success probability: Lower bound of 70 percent, upper bound of 90 percent, 
likely point estimate of 80 percent, and 
 FDA 510(k) application approval success: Lower bound of 90 percent, upper bound of 99 
percent, likely point estimate of 96 percent. 
5.1.7 Costs of Supply Chain Activities 
Rapid POC diagnostic developers, like drug and vaccine sponsors, need to undertake a variety of 
additional activities concurrently with clinical development, including manufacturing a sample of devices 
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using validated processes for use in clinical trials and other demonstrations and acquisition of GMP-
compliant capabilities.18  For antibacterial drugs, the ratio of supply chain activity costs to the sum of pre-
clinical, clinical, and post-clinical research is 2.8.  In the absence of published figures for rapid POC 
diagnostic manufacturer supply chain activity costs, we estimate the costs of these activities at $9.9 
million by applying the same ratio to total estimated rapid POC diagnostic development costs of $3.5 
million (i.e., sum of R&D, clinical research, and FDA approval costs).  We further assume that these costs 
are evenly distributed across the average 4.39 years it takes to bring a device to market in the model. 
5.1.8 Total Product Life 
As for drugs and vaccines, we use 20 years to characterize the average life cycle of a new rapid 
POC diagnostic upon market approval (DiMasi, Grabowski, & Vernon, 2004).  Though the span of time 
over which a rapid POC diagnostic is used may extend beyond this 20-year period, expected revenues 
from sales in years beyond 20 contribute very little to private ENPV due to discounting. 
5.1.9 Product Launch Success Probability 
According to Griffin (1997), only about 60 percent of new product launches end up being 
commercially successful.  As we did for antibacterial drugs and vaccines previously, we use this as our 
basis for new rapid POC diagnostics.  For sensitivity analysis, we use a triangular distribution for the 
product success probability with a lower bound of 40 percent and an upper bound of 80 percent. 
5.1.10 Average Expected Price per Patient  
As noted previously, there are a number of diagnostics for MRSA that are currently in the U.S. 
market.  To estimate the average expected price per patient, we used the reported per-patient test costs 
under  Cepheid’s  Federal  Supply  Schedule  agreement  with  the  Department  of  Veteran  Affairs.   Under that 
schedule, the per-patient-test cost for  Cepheid’s  Xpert  MRSA  assay  ranges  from  $71.02  to  $81.62  when  
their 3-year pricing option is used (Cepheid, 2008).  Thus, we estimate that the new rapid POC diagnostic 
will cost $76 per patient per test.  For sensitivity analysis, we use a triangular distribution for the average 
per-patient price with a lower bound of $70 and an upper bound of $85. 
5.1.11 Market Uptake 
Given the competitive landscape for rapid POC diagnostics for MRSA, we assume that the U.S. 
market share of the new entrant will range from 15 to 30 percent at peak-year sales with an expected 
market share of 24 percent given that the product launch success probability is estimated at 60 percent (= 
60% × 30% + [(1 – 60%) × 15%) (see Section 3.2.12).  
                                                     
18 Along with the manufacturing SOPs, device sponsors must develop a manufacturing system capable of producing 
their device according to their SOPs in a rigorous and consistent fashion.  Sponsors who are new to manufacturing 
might acquire this manufacturing capability from contract manufacturers, thereby avoiding the risk of a substantial 
capital investment in the, as yet, un-marketed product.  Contract manufacturers of medical devices are familiar with 
the relevant GMP requirements and are able to charge higher manufacturing prices as a result.  Manufacturers who 
have previously introduced medical devices to market successfully are likely to have developed their own good 
manufacturing capability (Eastern Research Group, Inc., 2012). 
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According to projections, the rapid POC diagnostic market for infectious diseases is expected to 
grow an average of 16 percent per year (Ben-Haim, 2008).  Assuming that expected first year market 
share is 6 percent, Table 23 presents the annual market share estimates for the new rapid POC diagnostic 
used in the model. 
Table 23: Estimates of Market Share over Time for a New Rapid POC Diagnostic for MRSA 
Year Market Share Lower Bound Upper Bound Expected 
1 4% 8% 6% 
2 5% 9% 7% 
3 5% 11% 9% 
4 6% 12% 10% 
5 7% 14% 12% 
6 8% 17% 13% 
7 10% 19% 16% 
8 11% 23% 18% 
9 13% 26% 21% 
10 15% 30% 24% 
Note: The expected market share in years beyond 10 is capped at 24%. 
5.1.12 Expected Percentage Reduction in Revenues due to Increased Competition 
The market for rapid POC diagnostics is competitive, especially for those infectious diseases that 
have the potential to impact sizeable populations, such as influenza and Group A Streptococcus. MRSA is 
one such market as there are many different strains of MRSA affecting a large number of individuals in 
many different healthcare settings at present (Collier, 2004). 
Unlike antibacterial drugs, rapid POC diagnostics do not have marketing exclusivity protections 
that would prevent other device manufacturers from market entry for a specified time period.  Thus, we 
assume that other manufacturers of rapid POC diagnostics for MRSA will enter the market over time 
reducing revenues to the developer.  According to research by ECRI (2008), FDA provided GeneOhm 
Sciences with 510(k) marketing clearance for their IDI-MRSA Assay (also known as the BD GeneOhm 
MRSA Assay) in March 2004.  Approximately 3 years later, FDA provided Cepheid Inc. with 510(k) 
clearance for their Xpert MRSA Assay (ECRI Institute, 2008).  Thus, for the model, we estimate the 
average time for experiencing a reduction in market share for a rapid POC diagnostic manufacturer at 3 
years.  Similar to antibacterial drugs, we further estimate reduction in revenues due to increased 
competition at 50 percent.  
5.1.13 Private ENPV Results 
Based on the above model parameters and assumptions, the private ENPV for a new MRSA rapid 
POC diagnostic manufacturer is $329 million.  The positive ENPV indicates that the expected returns 
from developing such a diagnostic are greater than its development costs.  The robust pipeline for MRSA 
rapid POC diagnostics in the U.S. lends support to the estimated sizable returns (see ECRI  Institute’s  
study  for  a  list  of  rapid  test’s  for  MRSA  under  development  in  the  U.S.).  However, while positive 
expected returns might be true for the MRSA diagnostic market, the diagnostics market for other 
FINAL APRIL 15, 2014 
 5-7 
pathogens of concern such as fungal infections caused by for example Aspergillus may not yield a 
sufficiently high private ENPV to encourage development. 
Similar to the antibacterial drug and vaccine analyses, we assessed the sensitivity of our results to 
our model parameters and assumptions by conducting a Monte Carlo analysis for which the point 
estimates were replaced by distribution of values (the probability distributions used and the applicable 
functional parameters are discussed in those sections applicable to the model parameter above).  This 
results in a large private ENPV range of $53.3 million to $435.4 million. The primary drivers for the 
observed wide range of results are attributable to the following model parameters in order of importance: 
 Real opportunity cost of capital, 
 R&D and clinical stage success probabilities, 
 Product launch success probability, and 
 Average expected price per test.  
Given that the average private ENPV is sizable for a manufacturer of a rapid POC diagnostic for 
MRSA, production incentives are not essential in this case. 
5.2 RAPID POC DIAGNOSTIC SOCIAL EPV MODEL PARAMETERS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The framework used to assess social benefits for a new MRSA rapid POC diagnostic is the same 
as that used for antibacterial drugs and vaccines as described earlier in this report. We use the same values 
for the real annual social discount rate, VSL, and VSLY as in the antibacterial drugs model.  Table 24 
presents the point estimates for the social EPV model parameters and assumptions.  The following 
sections discuss the basis for these estimates in further detail. 
Table 24: Social EPV Model Parameters and Assumptions for a MRSA Rapid POC Diagnostic 
Parameter Point Estimate 
Real Annual Social Rate of Discount 3.0% 
2000 Real Personal Income per capita in 2005 $ $28,888 
2012 Real Personal Income per capita in 2005 $ $32,635 
Real GDP Growth, 2000 – 2011 13.0% 
Income Elasticity of VSL 50.0% 
VSLY Inflator 1.065 
VSL in 2012 $ Adjusted for Income Overall $5,623,708 
VSLY in 2012 $ Adjusted for Income Overall $365,558 
Average Number of Lost QALYs for Patients with MRSA Infection 0.02393 
WTP (VSLY*Lost QALYs) per Patient $8,749 
MRSA Parameters  
     Average MRSA Colonization Rate for Patients Admitted to Hospital 10.0% 
     % of Patients Colonized with MRSA that Develop an Infection 33.3% 
     % of Patients with MRSA Infection that Die 9.2% 
     Expected MRSA Transmission Rate 1.7% 
     Expected Reduction in MRSA Transmission Rate due to Screening and Isolation 60% 
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5.2.1 Average Number of Lost QALYs for Patients with MRSA Infection 
Similar to the VSL and VSLY values, we used the average number of lost QALYs estimated for 
ABSSSI for patients with MRSA infection (see Section 3.6.5.2). 
5.2.2 Additional MRSA Parameters 
According to Guleri, et al. (2011), MRSA colonization rate among patients admitted to the 
hospital ranges from 6 to 11 percent.  Further, one third of patients colonized with MRSA tend to go on to 
develop an infection (Coia, et al., 2006).  Another study by Datta & Huang (2008) finds that around 9 
percent of patients that develop a MRSA infection die as a result.  In a blinded study of MRSA 
transmission, Fishbain, et al. (2003) find that out of 354 discharged patients who did not have MRSA 
upon admission, 20 were colonized after being admitted to the hospital due to exposure to MRSA in the 
hospital setting.  This translates to a transmission rate of 1.7 percent (= 20/354).  
Based on the information, we use the following estimates in the model: 
 MRSA colonization rate: Triangular probability distribution with a lower bound of 6 percent, 
upper bound of 11 percent, a likely point estimate of 10 percent, 
 Percentage of patients colonized with MRSA that develop an infection: Triangular probability 
distribution with a lower bound of 25 percent, upper bound of 42 percent, a likely point 
estimate of 33.3 percent, 
 Percentage of patients with MRSA infection that die: Triangular probability distribution with 
a lower bound of 7 percent, upper bound of 11 percent, a likely point estimate of 9.2 percent, 
and 
 Expected MRSA transmission rate: Triangular probability distribution with a lower bound of 
1 percent, upper bound of 2.5 percent, a likely point estimate of 1.7 percent. 
There are a number of studies that have investigated reductions in MRSA infection cases as a 
result of institution of a variety of infection control practices, such as hand washing, patient screening, 
and education.  Findings from these studies suggest that MRSA infections can be substantially reduced, 
50 to 70 percent, with the implementation of one or more of these strategies (Jernigan & Kallen, 2010).  
More recently, Guleri, et al. (2011) report a 78 percent reduction in MRSA bacteremias in a UK hospital 
after implementation of a rapid MRSA screening program.  For the model, we use an expected reduction 
in MRSA transmission of 60 percent due to the implementation of a rapid MRSA screening program that 
involves testing all patients admitted to the hospital upon visit to the emergency department.  For 
sensitivity analysis, we assume that the parameter follows a triangular probability distribution with a 
lower and upper bound of 50 and 70 percent, respectively. Based on the above parameters, Table 25 
presents the estimated total number of mortality and morbidity cases in the baseline and under RDT 
adoption in year 2011 as well as other intermediate parameter estimates used in arriving at the projected 
health outcomes.  We use the U.S. Census population projections to estimate the annual number of cases 
of avoided mortality and morbidity for years 2012 through 2040 used in the model. 
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Table 25: Estimates of Mortality and Morbidity under the Baseline without RDT and with RDT Adoption, Respectively 
Parameter Value 
Expected  RDT Adoption Rate 6.4% 
US Population 313,232,044 
Hospital Admissions Eligible for RDT 20,080,917 
Number with MRSA Colonization 2,008,092 
Baseline Number That will Acquire MRSA in the Hospital 306,319 
Baseline Number That will Develop An Infection 102,106 
Baseline Mortality 9,425 
Baseline Morbidity 92,681 
Projected Number That will be Tested with RDT 1,285,179 
Projected Number with MRSA Colonization Among those Tested with RDT 128,518 
Projected Number That will Acquire MRSA in the Hospital with RDT 7,842 
Projected Number That will Develop an Infection with RDT 2,614 
Projected Number That will Die due to MRSA Infection with RDT 241 
MRSA Cases Due to Non-Adopters 95,572 
Number That will Die due to MRSA Infection Among Non-Adopters 8,822 
Projected Mortality 9,063 
Projected Morbidity 89,122 
MRSA Cases Avoided Due to RDT 3,921 
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5.3 RAPID POC DIAGNOSTIC SOCIAL EPV RESULTS 
We estimate the social EPV of a new MRSA rapid POC diagnostic at $22.1 billion. Comparison 
of the social ENPV value to private ENPV shows that the social EPV is substantially higher than the 
private ENPV by $21.9 billion.  When a Monte Carlo analysis was conducted to gauge the sensitivity of 
our results to changes in model parameters and assumptions, we find that the social EPV could potentially 
range from $6.0 billion to $73.4 billion.  The primary drivers for the observed wide range of social EPV 
results include 1) expected MRSA transmission rate, 2) real annual social rate of discount, 3) clinical 
stage success probability, and 4) percentage of patients with MRSA infection that die.  
The results of this analysis, however, are limited to rapid POC diagnostics developed for MRSA 
and likely reflect the lower costs of development through the 510(k) process and the greater demand for a 
MRSA rapid POC diagnostic. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
We find that four of the six studied classes (CABP, ABSSI, CUTI and CIAI) had positive ENPVs 
for developers considering whether to enter the pre-clinical phase of development.  However, in all six 
classes private value fell below the $100 million threshold identified by industry and other experts as the 
ENPV threshold commonly used in decisions whether to enter pre-clinical trials.  As such, our findings 
suggest that incentives are desirable to stimulate research and development for antibacterial drugs to treat 
the six indications studied, ABOM, ABSSSI, CABP, CIAI, CUTI, and HABP/VABP, especially that the 
expected societal returns for bringing such drugs to market are significantly greater than the private 
returns for each indication. 
Given the degree of uncertainty associated with different model parameters, it is difficult to 
ascertain the necessary levels of such incentives.  However, the model does highlight certain regularities, 
which are relevant for policy-making.  In particular, the extent and magnitude of the incentives needed for 
those sponsors at different points along the decision tree (e.g., start of Phase 3), decrease the closer the 
sponsor is to a successful product launch.  This is primarily due to the effect of discounting, whereby the 
product revenues in out years contribute increasingly less to the net present value.  This dynamic 
contributes to the fact that intellectual property (IP) extensions are not sufficient by themselves to 
incentivize a drug sponsor at the start of pre-clinical phase.  Similarly, grants, awards and prizes for later 
drug development milestones must be quite substantial to induce developers to enter pre-clinical phases.  
And in parallel to the findings about other incentives, solely relying on regulatory modifications to 
shorten drug development process would not be sufficient to entice drug developers to enter pre-clinical 
research.  It seems that only a combination of incentives has the potential to sufficiently move the ENPV 
above the $100 million threshold, but identifying the possible combinations was outside the scope of this 
project. 
We should also note that simultaneous institution of conservation mechanisms, such as education 
campaigns to promote prudent use, and other stewardship programs, along with the types of antibacterial 
drug production incentives considered are likely to alter the incentive levels identified in this study.   
Conservation incentives, by their very nature, tend to reduce the potential market size for new 
antibacterial drugs thereby necessitating higher production incentive levels to boost private returns to the 
$100 million threshold. 
In addition to high model parameter uncertainty, there are other study limitations that further 
complicate derivation of reliable incentive levels needed to stimulate development.  The simplified nature 
of our decision tree is one such factor because it removes considerations such as drug development for 
multiple indications that directly impact expected private returns, development costs, and success 
probabilities.  Additionally, even though the model uses the most up to date and comprehensive data, it 
still lacks some antibacterial drug specific parameter values, such as the costs associated with supply 
chain activities.  Another limitation includes the consideration of the U.S. rather than the global market in 
estimating market sizes for the six indications due to data availability.  Limiting market analysis to U.S. 
likely results in underestimation of the market size for each indication and  therefore underestimates 
private ENPV in the absence of any incentives. 
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Perhaps  the  most  important  study  limitation  is  our  simplified  model’s  inability  to  account  for  
other decision criteria that drug developers use internally in deciding which new compounds to pursue.  In 
addition to private ENPV, developers often consider such factors as peak-year sales value, return on R&D 
investment and expected returns in comparison to other new product candidates, and whether the 
compound  fits  in  with  one’s  existing or planned product portfolio.  These kinds of synergies, especially if 
accompanied by cost of capital lower than assumed in this model, could translate into higher ENPV value 
for those players.  Coupled with differing opportunity costs (the $100 million threshold), it is possible that 
some industry players may have stronger incentives to enter pre-clinical phases of drug development than 
this average model suggests.  
Nonetheless, our model provides a necessary and transparent analytical model with which 
incentive discussions can be framed, particularly when coupled with a discussion of incentives to 
stimulate the public state of knowledge about pathogens and disease progression. 
For the development of vaccines for ABOM and rapid POC diagnostics for MRSA, we find that 
incentives are not needed to stimulate development.  The ENPV for an ABOM vaccine is $515.1 million 
and the ENPV for a MRSA POC diagnostic is $ 329 million; both are greater than a threshold ENPV of 
around $100 million needed for development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As noted in Section 3.2.13, we estimate market size for each indication based on 2011 sales data 
obtained from IMS Health in three different ways: 
 Estimate 1: Total sales of antibacterial drugs that are in the formulation of interest (i.e., oral 
or IV) labeled to treat the indication. 
 Estimate 2: Total sales of all antibacterial drugs in Estimate 1, plus other formulations of the 
antibacterial drugs in Estimate 1, plus any other antibacterial drugs (in any formulation) 
approved to treat the indication. 
 Estimate 3: Total sales of all antibacterial drugs in Estimate 2 plus any antibacterial drugs that 
compete with antibacterial drugs in Estimate 2 for treating other indications (i.e., if a drug 
included in Estimate 2 is also used to treat another indication, all other drugs used to treat that 
other indication are added to the total sales calculation for this final estimate).  Due to the 
extent of overlap among drugs used to treat these indications, Estimate 3 is the same across 
all indications considered ($9.23 billion).  
The three estimates are intended to reflect differing visions of drug manufacturers as they 
consider potential market size.  The smallest estimate is for the drug and formulation specifically under 
development, which represents the most conservative or narrowly defined market vision.  The medium 
estimate represents the larger potential market for treating the same indications, but also reflects the 
possibility that the NME can be formulated for oral administration as well.  The largest estimate 
represents all potential antibacterial drugs with which the NME might compete if it can also be approved 
to treat other indications.  More details on the drugs included in each market size estimate are provided in 
the following sections. It should be noted that some of the drugs used in generating these estimates may 
have been discontinued since the time for the data collection. 
ACUTE BACTERIAL OTITIS MEDIA (ABOM) 
A.1.1 Background 
Acute bacterial otitis media (ABOM) is an infection of the middle ear.. It is the most common 
infection for which antibacterial drugs are prescribed for children in the United States, though it can also 
occur in adults. Streptococcus pneumoniae is the most commonly identified bacterium in ABOM among 
children, found in approximately 25% to 50% of cases; Haemophilus influenzae is found in 15%-30% of 
cases, and Moraxella catarrhalis in 3% to 20% of cases  
The economic burden associated with acute otitis media (including non-bacterial causes) is 
substantial, particularly when the indirect costs associated with lost time from school and work (for 
parents) are taken into account. According to a 2001 study, the direct cost of acute otitis media in was 
estimated to be $1.96 billion in 1995, and the indirect cost was estimated at $1.02 billion Recent studies 
of outpatient survey data indicate that there are roughly between 9 million and 16 million physician office 
visits for acute otitis media every year 
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A.1.2 Current Treatment 
Physicians may manage patients with ABOM with either a short period (48-72 hours) of 
observation and then antibacterial therapy if symptoms do not improve or by starting antibacterials 
immediately.  If a decision is made to treat with antibacterial drugs, amoxicillin is recommended as the 
first antibacterial agent of choice, but alternative drugs (including cefdinir, cefpodoxime, azithromycin, 
and clarithromycin) may be used if the patient has allergic reactions to penicillin.  
A.1.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 1: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for ABOM 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMOXICILLIN (oral) AMPICILLIN (IV) AMIKACIN (IV) 
AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC 
ACID (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (IV) AMPICILLIN (oral) 
AZITHROMYCIN (oral) CEFTRIAXONE (IV) AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV) 
CEFDINIR (oral) CEFUROXIME (IV) AZTREONAM (IV) 
CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL (oral) ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) CEFACLOR (oral) 
CEFPROZIL (oral) MINOCYCLINE (IV) CEFADROXIL (oral) 
CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral) PENICILLIN G (IV) CEFAZOLIN (IV) 
CEPHALEXIN (oral) SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (IV) CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) 
CLARITHROMYCIN (oral)   CEFEPIME (IV) 
ERYTHROMYCIN (oral)   CEFOTAXIME (IV) 
MINOCYCLINE (oral)   CEFOTETAN (IV) 
PENICILLIN G (oral)   CEFOXITIN (IV) 
SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMET
HOPRIM (oral)   CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) 
TETRACYCLINE (oral)   CEFTAZIDIME (IV) 
    CEFTIZOXIME (IV) 
    CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) 
    CIPROFLOXACIN (IV) 
    CIPROFLOXACIN (oral) 
    CLINDAMYCIN (IV) 
    CLINDAMYCIN (oral) 
    COLISTIN (IV) 
    DAPTOMYCIN (IV) 
    DOXYCYCLINE (IV) 
    DOXYCYCLINE (oral) 
    ERTAPENEM (IV) 
    GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) 
    GENTAMICIN (IV) 
    IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV) 
    LEVOFLOXACIN (IV) 
    LEVOFLOXACIN (oral) 
    LINEZOLID (IV) 
    LINEZOLID (oral) 
    LOMEFLOXACIN (oral) 
    MEROPENEM (IV) 
    METRONIDAZOLE (IV) 
    METRONIDAZOLE (oral) 
FINAL APRIL 15, 2014 
 A-4 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
    MOXIFLOXACIN (IV) 
    MOXIFLOXACIN (oral) 
    NAFCILLIN (IV) 
    NORFLOXACIN (oral) 
    OFLOXACIN (oral) 
    OXACILLIN (IV) 
    PIPERACILLIN (IV) 
    PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM (IV) 
    QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN (IV) 
    TELAVANCIN (IV) 
    TELITHROMYCIN (oral) 
    TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (IV) 
    TIGECYCLINE (IV) 
    TOBRAMYCIN (IV) 
    VANCOMYCIN (IV) 
    VANCOMYCIN (oral) 
 
ACUTE BACTERIAL SKIN AND SKIN STRUCTURE INFECTION (ABSSSI) 
A.2.1 Background 
Acute bacterial skin and skin structure infections (ABSSSIs) are a subgroup of skin and soft 
tissue infections (SSTIs), which are commonly occurring microbial infections of the epidermis, dermis 
and subcutaneous tissues For the purpose of clinical trial design, ABSSSIs are defined by FDA guidance 
to include such conditions as cellulitis/erysipelas, wound infections, burn infections, cutaneous abscesses, 
and impetigo. Infections of animal or human bites, necrotizing fasciitis, diabetic foot infections, decubitus 
ulcer infections, myonecrosis, ecthyma gangrenosum, and catheter-site infections are specifically 
excluded because they generally require different medical management than ABSSSI.  
SSTIs can have diverse etiologies, and identification of the causative agent is often difficult; 
however, the majority of SSTIs are caused by Staphylococcus aureus and streptococci. The economic 
burden associated with SSTIs is substantial and growing. Total hospital admissions for SSTIs increased 
by 29 percent between 2000 and 2004 and the number of visits (and visit rate) to ambulatory care 
facilities increased from 8.6 million (32.1 visits per 1000 population) to 14.2 million visits (48.1 per 
1000) between 1997 and 2005. These increases have been attributed largely to increasing resistance to 
antibacterial drug agents among the microorganisms that most commonly cause these infections 
especially methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) According to a recent study, the total 
economic burden of S. aureus infection was estimated to be $14.5 billion for all inpatient stays in 2003 
A.2.2 Current Treatment 
While uncomplicated SSTIs may be treated in the outpatient setting with oral dicloxacillin–
flucloxacillin  or cephalexin (or, alternatively, penicillin, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, macrolides, 
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tetracyclines, or clindamycin), more serious SSTIs often require parenteral administration of 
antimicrobial agents, such as ceftriaxone, clindamycin, penicillins, and cefazolin In cases of complicated 
SSTIs caused by MRSA, intravenous administration of vancomycin, linezolid, daptomycin, telavancin, or 
clindamycin is recommended. Outpatient treatment of MRSA infections may involve oral clindamycin, 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole, doxycycline, minocycline, linezolid, or cephalexin. 
A.2.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 2: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for ABSSSI 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV) CEFACLOR (oral) AMIKACIN (IV) 
AZTREONAM (IV) CEFADROXIL (oral) AMOXICILLIN (oral) 
CEFAZOLIN (IV) CEFDINIR (oral) AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (oral) 
CEFEPIME (IV) CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) AMPICILLIN (IV) 
CEFOTAXIME (IV) CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL (oral) AMPICILLIN (oral) 
CEFOTETAN (IV) CEFPROZIL (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (IV) 
CEFOXITIN (IV) CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) CEPHALEXIN (oral) CLARITHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFTAZIDIME (IV) CIPROFLOXACIN (oral) COLISTIN (IV) 
CEFTIZOXIME (IV) CLINDAMYCIN (oral) ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) 
CEFTRIAXONE (IV) DOXYCYCLINE (oral) ERYTHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFUROXIME (IV) LEVOFLOXACIN (oral) GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) 
CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) LINEZOLID (oral) GENTAMICIN (IV) 
CIPROFLOXACIN (IV) METRONIDAZOLE (oral) LOMEFLOXACIN (oral) 
CLINDAMYCIN (IV) MOXIFLOXACIN (oral) MINOCYCLINE (IV) 
DAPTOMYCIN (IV) OFLOXACIN (oral) MINOCYCLINE (oral) 
DOXYCYCLINE (IV) PENICILLIN G (oral) NORFLOXACIN (oral) 
ERTAPENEM (IV) SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (oral) PIPERACILLIN (IV) 
IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV) VANCOMYCIN (oral) TELITHROMYCIN (oral) 
LEVOFLOXACIN (IV)   TETRACYCLINE (oral) 
LINEZOLID (IV)   TOBRAMYCIN (IV) 
MEROPENEM (IV)     
METRONIDAZOLE (IV)     
MOXIFLOXACIN (IV)     
NAFCILLIN (IV)     
OXACILLIN (IV)     
PENICILLIN G (IV)     
PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM 
(IV)     
QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN 
(IV)     
SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETH
OPRIM (IV)     
TELAVANCIN (IV)     
TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID 
(IV)     
TIGECYCLINE (IV)     
VANCOMYCIN (IV)     
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COMMUNITY ACQUIRED BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA (CABP) 
A.3.1 Background 
Community-acquired bacterial pneumonia (CABP) is an acute infection that involves the lungs.  
CABP is associated with symptoms such as fever or, chills, rigors, cough, chest pain, or dyspnea, and 
accompanied by the presence of a new lobar or multilobar infiltrate on a chest radiograph.  Streptococcus 
pneumoniae is the most commonly identified bacterium in CABP.  Other bacteria that cause CABP 
include Haemophilus influenzae, Staphylococcus aureus, Mycoplasma pneumoniae, Chlamydophila 
pneumoniae, and Legionella species.  A causative agent is not identified in 30 percent to 50 percent of 
cases with currently employed diagnostic techniques.  
The economic burden associated with community-acquired pneumonia (including non-bacterial 
causes) remains substantial at greater than $17 billion annually in the United States. Despite the 
availability and widespread adherence to recommended treatment guidelines, the disease continues to 
present a significant burden in adults. Furthermore, given the aging population, clinicians can expect to 
encounter an increasing number of adult patients with the disease. 
A.3.2 Current Treatment 
Patients with CABP are started on antibacterial drugs as soon as possible. Because the causative 
organism is difficult to identify, physicians choose antibacterial drugs for the most common pathogen(s) 
associated with the condition and the severity of illness. Most CABP patients improve with antibacterial 
drug treatment. For those patients whose conditions do not improve, physicians look for unusual 
organisms, resistance to the antibacterial drug used for treatment, infection with a second organism, or 
some other disorder (such as a problem with the immune system or a lung abnormality) that might be 
delaying recovery. 
In the absence of comorbidities and a low-risk determination, a patient is typically treated on an 
outpatient basis. The preferred antibacterial drugs for outpatient treatment are macrolides (azithromycin, 
clarithromycin, or erythromycin), and doxycycline (Vibramycin), a tetracycline. The preferred 
antibacterial drug treatment for high-risk patients with comorbidities is an intravenous beta-lactam 
(cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, or ampicillin) plus a macrolide or a fluoroquinolone alone delivered in an 
inpatient setting 
A.3.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 3: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for CABP 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMPICILLIN (IV) AMOXICILLIN (oral) AMIKACIN (IV) 
AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV) AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (oral) CEFADROXIL (oral) 
AZITHROMYCIN (IV) AMPICILLIN (oral) CEFAZOLIN (IV) 
AZTREONAM (IV) AZITHROMYCIN (oral) CEFTAZIDIME (IV) 
CEFEPIME (IV) CEFACLOR (oral) CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) 
CEFOTAXIME (IV) CEFDINIR (oral) CIPROFLOXACIN (IV) 
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Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
CEFOTETAN (IV) CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) COLISTIN (IV) 
CEFOXITIN (IV) CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL (oral) DAPTOMYCIN (IV) 
CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) CEFPROZIL (oral) GENTAMICIN (IV) 
CEFTIZOXIME (IV) CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral) LOMEFLOXACIN (oral) 
CEFTRIAXONE (IV) CEPHALEXIN (oral) MEROPENEM (IV) 
CEFUROXIME (IV) CIPROFLOXACIN (oral) METRONIDAZOLE (IV) 
CLINDAMYCIN (IV) CLARITHROMYCIN (oral) METRONIDAZOLE (oral) 
DOXYCYCLINE (IV) CLINDAMYCIN (oral) MINOCYCLINE (IV) 
ERTAPENEM (IV) DOXYCYCLINE (oral) NORFLOXACIN (oral) 
ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) ERYTHROMYCIN (oral) QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN (IV) 
IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV) GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) TELAVANCIN (IV) 
LEVOFLOXACIN (IV) LEVOFLOXACIN (oral) TOBRAMYCIN (IV) 
LINEZOLID (IV) LINEZOLID (oral)   
MOXIFLOXACIN (IV) MINOCYCLINE (oral)   
NAFCILLIN (IV) MOXIFLOXACIN (oral)   
OXACILLIN (IV) OFLOXACIN (oral)   
PENICILLIN G (IV) PENICILLIN G (oral)   
PIPERACILLIN (IV) SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (oral)   
PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM (IV) TELITHROMYCIN (oral)   
SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHO
PRIM (IV) TETRACYCLINE (oral)   
TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID 
(IV) VANCOMYCIN (oral)   
TIGECYCLINE (IV)     
VANCOMYCIN (IV)     
 
COMPLICATED INTRA-ABDOMINAL INFECTION (CIAI) 
A.4.1 Background 
Intra-abdominal infections (IAIs) comprise a wide range of pathological conditions, such as 
appendicitis, diverticulitis, gastroduodenal perforation, cholangitis, cholecystitis, and pancreatitis. IAIs 
are typically subcategorized as either uncomplicated or complicated, although the distinction between 
them is not always clear.  Generally, uncomplicated IAIs involve a single organ and treatment includes 
surgical resection and perioperative prophylaxis only. Complicated IAIs (CIAIs) occur when the infection 
extends outside the organ that is the source of the infection into the peritoneal cavity. Most CIAIs involve 
peritonitis or intra-abdominal abscesses.  
IAIs can also be classified as either community-acquired or healthcare-associated. Community-
acquired IAIs develop in individuals that have not undergone recent surgical intervention or 
hospitalization. It is estimated that appendicitis and diverticulitis together comprise more than 80 percent 
of all community-acquired CIAIs. In contrast, healthcare-associated infections appear 48 hours or more 
after hospital admission, often during treatment for other conditions or as a post-surgical complication. 
Although most intra-abdominal infections are community-acquired, healthcare–associated pathogens are 
of increasing concern given the rising threat of resistant bacteria. 
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As CIAIs are often caused by resident gastrointestinal flora, their microbial etiology depends on 
the level of disruption of the gastrointestinal tract, where the number of microorganisms increases further 
down the gastrointestinal tract. Predominant pathogens include enteric gram-negative bacilli, gram-
positive cocci, and anaerobic microorganisms. 
A.4.2 Current Treatment 
CIAIs are likely to be managed in an inpatient setting, as successful treatment is dependent on 
both source control (e.g., surgical drainage and definitive management of the source) and antimicrobial 
treatment.  
For IAIs, the location of the primary source of infection, the presence of comorbidities, and 
whether the infection is community-acquired or healthcare-associated are critical factors in predicting 
antibacterial drug susceptibilities.  Healthcare-associated CIAIs are frequently associated with more 
resistant flora. Complicated IAIs can be treated with either single agent or combination therapy 
antimicrobials. Agents approved for use include ticarcillin-clavulanate, cefoxitin, moxifloxacin, 
ertapenem, and tigecycline.  The empiric use of antimicrobial regimens such as  meropenem, imipenem-
cilastatin, doripenem, piperacillin-tazobactam, ciprofloxacin or levofloxacin in combination with 
metronidazole, or ceftazidime or cefepime in combination with metronidazole, is recommended for 
patients with high-severity community-acquired intra-abdominal infection.  
A.4.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 4: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for CIAI 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMIKACIN (IV) AMPICILLIN (oral) AMOXICILLIN (oral) 
AMPICILLIN (IV) CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral) AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (oral) 
AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV) CIPROFLOXACIN (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (IV) 
AZTREONAM (IV) CLINDAMYCIN (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFEPIME (IV) DOXYCYCLINE (oral) CEFACLOR (oral) 
CEFOTAXIME (IV) LINEZOLID (oral) CEFADROXIL (oral) 
CEFOTETAN (IV) MOXIFLOXACIN (oral) CEFAZOLIN (IV) 
CEFOXITIN (IV) VANCOMYCIN (oral) CEFDINIR (oral) 
CEFTAZIDIME (IV)   CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) 
CEFTIZOXIME (IV)   CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL (oral) 
CEFTRIAXONE (IV)   CEFPROZIL (oral) 
CEFUROXIME (IV)   CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) 
CIPROFLOXACIN (IV)   CEPHALEXIN (oral) 
CLINDAMYCIN (IV)   CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) 
COLISTIN (IV)   CLARITHROMYCIN (oral) 
DOXYCYCLINE (IV)   DAPTOMYCIN (IV) 
ERTAPENEM (IV)   ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) 
GENTAMICIN (IV)   ERYTHROMYCIN (oral) 
IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV)   GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) 
LINEZOLID (IV)   LEVOFLOXACIN (IV) 
MEROPENEM (IV)   LEVOFLOXACIN (oral) 
MOXIFLOXACIN (IV)   LOMEFLOXACIN (oral) 
NAFCILLIN (IV)   METRONIDAZOLE (IV) 
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OXACILLIN (IV)   METRONIDAZOLE (oral) 
PIPERACILLIN (IV)   MINOCYCLINE (IV) 
PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM 
(IV)   MINOCYCLINE (oral) 
TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID 
(IV)   NORFLOXACIN (oral) 
TIGECYCLINE (IV)   OFLOXACIN (oral) 
TOBRAMYCIN (IV)   PENICILLIN G (IV) 
VANCOMYCIN (IV)   PENICILLIN G (oral) 
    QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN (IV) 
    SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (IV) 
    SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (oral) 
    TELAVANCIN (IV) 
    TELITHROMYCIN (oral) 
    TETRACYCLINE (oral) 
 
COMPLICATED URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS (CUTI) 
A.5.1 Background 
Complicated urinary tract infections (CUTIs) are those infections diagnosed in individuals with 
structural or functional abnormalities of the genitourinary tract.  Factors that may contribute to 
complicated infections include indwelling catheters, neurogenic bladder, renal failure, obstructive 
uropathy, urinary retention, and pregnancy. It is estimated that complicated UTIs comprise less than five 
percent of cases of UTIs. 
Escherichia coli  is the causative agent in almost all cases of uncomplicated UTI and about 60 
percent of cases of complicated UTI. A wide variety of other gram-negative and gram-positive 
bacteriacan also cause CUTI, including, Klebsiella pneumonia, Proteus mirabilis, Providencia species, 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Enterococcus species, and Coagulase-negative staphylococcus.  Overall, UTI 
is one of the most common bacterial infections in both the community and healthcare settings.  Catheter-
associated UTI is the most frequently occurring nosocomial infection As a result of its high incidence, the 
economic burden associated with urinary tract infection is substantial. Symptomatic catheter-associated 
UTI has been associated with an increased hospital stay of 1-2 days at an additional minimal cost of $676 
per patient 
A.5.2 Current Treatment 
Treatment often involves empiric broad-spectrum antibacterial drug therapy, initially. 
Modifications of the antibacterial drug regimen can be made after urine culture and sensitivity analysis 
results are obtained. Mild to moderately ill patients may be treated in an outpatient setting with oral 
antibacterial drugs, such as norfloxacin or ciprofloxacin.  Antibacterial drugs are typically prescribed for 
7 to 14 days, with longer courses of treatment for more severe complicated urinary tract infections. 
Patients with more severe infections, such as complicated pyelonephritis, or those accompanied by severe 
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symptoms may require hospitalization and intravenous antibacterial drugs, such as ampicillin and 
gentamicin, ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin, ceftriaxone, aztreonam, ticarcillin-clavulanate, or imipenem-
cilastatin 
A.5.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 5: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for CUTI 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMIKACIN (IV) AMPICILLIN (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (IV) 
AMOXICILLIN (oral) LINEZOLID (oral) AZITHROMYCIN (oral) 
AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC 
ACID (oral) MINOCYCLINE (IV) CEFAZOLIN (IV) 
AMPICILLIN (IV) VANCOMYCIN (oral) CEFDINIR (oral) 
AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV)   CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) 
AZTREONAM (IV)   CEFPROZIL (oral) 
CEFACLOR (oral)   CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) 
CEFADROXIL (oral)   CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) 
CEFEPIME (IV)   CLARITHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFOTAXIME (IV)   CLINDAMYCIN (IV) 
CEFOTETAN (IV)   CLINDAMYCIN (oral) 
CEFOXITIN (IV)   DAPTOMYCIN (IV) 
CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL 
(oral)   ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) 
CEFTAZIDIME (IV)   ERYTHROMYCIN (oral) 
CEFTIZOXIME (IV)   GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) 
CEFTRIAXONE (IV)   MEROPENEM (IV) 
CEFUROXIME (IV)   METRONIDAZOLE (IV) 
CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral)   METRONIDAZOLE (oral) 
CEPHALEXIN (oral)   MOXIFLOXACIN (IV) 
CIPROFLOXACIN (IV)   MOXIFLOXACIN (oral) 
CIPROFLOXACIN (oral)   OXACILLIN (IV) 
COLISTIN (IV)   PENICILLIN G (IV) 
DOXYCYCLINE (IV)   PENICILLIN G (oral) 
DOXYCYCLINE (oral)   QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN (IV) 
ERTAPENEM (IV)   TELAVANCIN (IV) 
GENTAMICIN (IV)   TELITHROMYCIN (oral) 
IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV)   TIGECYCLINE (IV) 
LEVOFLOXACIN (IV)     
LEVOFLOXACIN (oral)     
LINEZOLID (IV)     
LOMEFLOXACIN (oral)     
MINOCYCLINE (oral)     
NAFCILLIN (IV)     
NORFLOXACIN (oral)     
OFLOXACIN (oral)     
PIPERACILLIN (IV)     
PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM 
(IV)     
SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIME
THOPRIM (IV)     
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SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIME
THOPRIM (oral)     
TETRACYCLINE (oral)     
TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC 
ACID (IV)     
TOBRAMYCIN (IV)     
VANCOMYCIN (IV)     
HOSPITAL ACQUIRED BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA (HABP)/VENTILATOR ASSOCIATED 
BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA (VABP) 
A.6.1 Background 
Hospital-acquired bacterial pneumonia (HABP) and ventilator-associated bacterial pneumonia 
(VABP) are acute infections of the that occur, by definition, in hospitalized patients. The bacteria that 
commonly cause HABP and VABP include Gram-negative bacilli including Pseudomonas aeruginosa, 
Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and Legionella. 
The economic burden associated with HABP and VABP is significant. HABP/VABP is currently 
the second most common type of nosocomial infection in the United States and is associated with high 
mortality and morbidity, especially in the intensive care unit (ICU).  HABP accounts for up to a quarter of 
all ICU infections and for over half of the antibacterial drugs prescribed, with nearly 90 percent of ICU 
episodes occurring during mechanical ventilation.  HABP/VABP  increases  patients’  duration  of  hospital  
stay by several days, increasing treatment costs substantially 
A.6.2 Current Treatment 
According to American Thoracic Society/Infectious Diseases Society of America guidelines, 
patients with no known risk factors for multi-drug resistant pathogens and early onset of disease may 
receive initial intravenous treatment with antibacterial drugs such as ceftriaxone, levofloxacin, 
moxifloxacin, ciprofloxacin, ampicillin/sulbactam, or ertapenem, depending on the potential pathogen. 
Patients with late-onset disease or other risk factors for infection with multi-drug resistant 
pathogens should be treated with antibacterial agents likely to cover the suspected etiologies. Possible 
therapies include an antipseudomonal cephalosporin (cefepime, ceftazidime); an antipseudomonal 
carbepenem (imipenem or meropenem); a beta-lactam/beta-lactamase inhibitor (piperacillin–tazobactam) 
plus an antipseudomonal fluoroquinolone (ciprofloxacin or levofloxacin); or an aminoglycoside 
(amikacin, gentamicin, or tobramycin) plus linezolid or vancomycin.  
B.6.3 List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates 
Appendix Table 6: List of Drugs Used in Determining Different Market Size Estimates for 
HABP/VABP 
Market Size Estimate 1 Market Size Estimate 2 Market Size Estimate 3 
AMIKACIN (IV) CIPROFLOXACIN (oral) AMOXICILLIN (oral) 
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CEFEPIME (IV) LEVOFLOXACIN (oral) AMOXICILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (oral) 
CEFTAZIDIME (IV) LINEZOLID (oral) AMPICILLIN (IV) 
CIPROFLOXACIN (IV) VANCOMYCIN (oral) AMPICILLIN (oral) 
COLISTIN (IV)   AMPICILLIN/SULBACTAM (IV) 
GENTAMICIN (IV)   AZITHROMYCIN (IV) 
IMIPENEM/CILASTATIN (IV)   AZITHROMYCIN (oral) 
LEVOFLOXACIN (IV)   AZTREONAM (IV) 
LINEZOLID (IV)   CEFACLOR (oral) 
MEROPENEM (IV)   CEFADROXIL (oral) 
PIPERACILLIN/TAZOBACTAM 
(IV)   CEFAZOLIN (IV) 
TOBRAMYCIN (IV)   CEFDINIR (oral) 
VANCOMYCIN (IV)   CEFDITOREN PIVOXIL (oral) 
    CEFOTAXIME (IV) 
    CEFOTETAN (IV) 
    CEFOXITIN (IV) 
    CEFPODOXIME PROXETIL (oral) 
    CEFPROZIL (oral) 
    CEFTAROLINE FOSAMIL (IV) 
    CEFTIZOXIME (IV) 
    CEFTRIAXONE (IV) 
    CEFUROXIME (IV) 
    CEFUROXIME AXETIL (oral) 
    CEPHALEXIN (oral) 
    CHLORAMPHENICOL (IV) 
    CLARITHROMYCIN (oral) 
    CLINDAMYCIN (IV) 
    CLINDAMYCIN (oral) 
    DAPTOMYCIN (IV) 
    DOXYCYCLINE (IV) 
    DOXYCYCLINE (oral) 
    ERTAPENEM (IV) 
    ERYTHROMYCIN (IV) 
    ERYTHROMYCIN (oral) 
    GEMIFLOXACIN (oral) 
    LOMEFLOXACIN (oral) 
    METRONIDAZOLE (IV) 
    METRONIDAZOLE (oral) 
    MINOCYCLINE (IV) 
    MINOCYCLINE (oral) 
    MOXIFLOXACIN (IV) 
    MOXIFLOXACIN (oral) 
    NAFCILLIN (IV) 
    NORFLOXACIN (oral) 
    OFLOXACIN (oral) 
    OXACILLIN (IV) 
    PENICILLIN G (IV) 
    PENICILLIN G (oral) 
    PIPERACILLIN (IV) 
    QUINUPRISTIN/DALFOPRISTIN (IV) 
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    SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (IV) 
    SULFAMETHOXAZOLE/TRIMETHOPRIM (oral) 
    TELAVANCIN (IV) 
    TELITHROMYCIN (oral) 
    TETRACYCLINE (oral) 
    TICARCILLIN/CLAVULANIC ACID (IV) 
    TIGECYCLINE (IV) 
 
